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Meates , Geoffrey Wells , 1900-1985 , Lieutenant Colonel

Meechie , Helen Guild , 1938-2001 , Director of the WRAC

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Messenger , William de Lemos Milles , 1913-2005 , Colonel

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Metcalfe , Hugh , 1928-2002 , weapons engineer and historian

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Meynell , Hugo I , fl 1956 , aide de camp

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1946-1953

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) committee was the principal US inter-service body which, together with the British Chiefs of Staff, formed the Combined Chiefs of Staff committee, the supreme Anglo- American military strategic and operational authority, 1942-1945. With the formation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in Dec 1941 it became necessary to form an American agency with comparable decision making structure to that of the British Chiefs of Staff (COS). This was formally inaugurated in Feb 1942 as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) committee, its first members being Gen George Catlett Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff , Adm Harold Raynsford Stark and Adm Ernest Joseph King, US Navy, and Lt Gen Henry H 'Hap' Arnold, US Army Air Forces. In Jul 1942, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed Adm William D Leahy as his political and military representative and Chief of Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee. Unlike the British Chiefs of Staff (COS), which was integrated into the British Cabinet system, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff was responsible primarily to the President of the United States as Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces. Under Leahy's leadership, the Joint Chiefs of Staff became the centre of the US executive command structure during World War Two and was responsible for operational strategy in the Pacific, the co-ordination of US military operations in the Far East, and the planning and co-ordination of US operational strategy elsewhere. In addition, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff functioned together under the auspices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to plan Allied strategic and operational efforts in Europe, North Africa, and the Far East. Following World War Two, the need for a formal structure of US joint command was apparent and the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff offered a workable model. The first legislative step was the passage of the National Security Act in 1947, which formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 10 Aug 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff became a US statutory agency and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), became the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff included the Chief of Staff, US Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, and the Commandant, US Marine Corps. The chiefs were able to respond to a request or voluntarily submit, through the Chairman, advice or opinion to the President, the Secretary of State, or the National Security Council, but they had no executive authority to commit combatant forces. In addition to their responsibilities on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military service chiefs were responsible to the secretaries of their military departments for management of the services as they prepared and directed unified and other combat commands under the Secretary of Defense.

US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 1945-1982

President Dwight David Eisenhower and his Cabinet, 1953- 1961

Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Special Operations Branch, London, and Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Secret Intelligence Branch, London

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the approximate US counterpart of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, and Special Operations Executive (SOE), with which it co-operated throughout World War Two and its immediate aftermath. The OSS was created by Presidential Military Order on 13 Jun 1942 and it functioned as the principal US intelligence organisation in all operational theatres. Its primary function was to obtain information about enemy nations and to sabotage their war potential and morale. From 1940-1942, the US had no central intelligence agency responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information bearing on national security, these services having been dispersed amongst the armed services and regional desks in the US State Department. In Jul 1941 Maj Gen William Joseph Donovan was appointed by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the civilian post of Co-ordinator of Information (COI) and was instructed to consolidate a regular channel of global strategic information. Under Donovan's leadership, the COI claimed the functions of information gathering, propaganda, espionage, subversion, and post-war planning. The overt propaganda functions of the COI were eventually severed and the COI was re-organised as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942. The OSS was instructed by the President to collect and analyse such strategic information as might be required to plan and operate special military services in theatres of operation directed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The headquarters of the OSS were in Washington, but is also maintained overseas outposts which engaged in information gathering and liaison operations with Allied intelligence services, most notably Special Operations Executive (SOE). Chief among the overseas units was the London Outpost, established at the end of 1941 to facilitate co-operation between the Allied intelligence services, and to serve as a base of operations for Allied intelligence, espionage and operational activities in Europe. The Special Operations (SO) Branch, OSS, London, was charged with conducting sabotage operations, support and supply of resistance groups, and guerrilla warfare in enemy-occupied territories. The 'London Group' of SOE was its British counterpart. On 10 Jan 1944, the SO Branch and the London Group were integrated into Special Forces Headquarters, under which they were charged with carrying on their operations. Thus, from Jan-Sep 1944, 93 Jedburgh teams, consisting of one British SOE soldier, one American OSS soldier, and one officer native to the country in which the team would operate, were parachuted into occupied Western Europe to supply resistance movements and co-ordinate operations. The purpose of the Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch, OSS, London, was to collect and analyse strategic intelligence as was required by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The OSS was terminated by Executive Order 9620 on 20 Sep 1945, its functions later assumed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

US Department of Defense, 1947-1981

Dwight David Eisenhower, President of the USA, 1953-1961

Dean Gooderham Acheson, US Secretary of State, 1949-1953.

President Harry S Truman, and political and military representatives at the Potsdam Conference, 1945

President's Science Advisory Committee (PASC)

National Security Council and McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,

The John F National Security Files, 1961-1963, were the working files of McGeorge Bundy as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1961-66. Bundy was formerly a political analyst, Council of Foreign Relations, 1948-49; Harvard University visiting lecturer, 1949-51; Associate Professor of Government, Harvard University, 1951-54; and Dean, Faculty of Arts and Science, Harvard University, 1951-61. The documents in this collection originated in the offices of Bundy and his assistants, Walt Whitman Rostow and Carl Kaysen and consist of communications traffic between the various executive departments and agencies of the US government, especially those concerning US foreign affairs and national defence. To meet the challenges faced by his administration, US President John Fitzgerald Kennedy re-modelled the machinery of US foreign policy and established a small cell within the National Security Council (NSC) to enhance his executive control over the foreign policy decision making process. Kennedy enlisted advisers from top positions in academia and industry, including as his special assistant, McGeorge Bundy. Bundy eliminated the committee system of previous administrations and instead made the NSC a compact policy making body which included Robert Komer, Gordon Chase, Michael Forrestal, David Klein, and Bromley Smith. Soon, the White House and the NSC established its own situation room and installed equipment that gave it direct access to State Department, Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency cables. The NSC maintained effective liaison with the State Department, particularly with Secretary of State David (Dean) Rusk. The NSC under Bundy managed the flow of information, intelligence, and decision papers to the president, cable traffic between the departments and agencies in Washington, DC, and embassies abroad; memoranda of conversations between US and foreign officials and among top US officials; intelligence reports assessing foreign policy issues, especially those from the Central Intelligence Agency; internal memoranda, including those from Bundy to Kennedy; and, agenda for and records of executive meetings. It remained, throughout the Kennedy administration, the president's major foreign policy instrument.

US Department of State, 1945-59

The US Department of State is the lead US foreign affairs agency. It advances US objectives and interests through formulating, representing, and implementing the foreign policy of the President of the United States. The US Secretary of State, the ranking member of the Cabinet and fourth in line of presidential succession, is the President's principal adviser on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for US representation abroad. The 1947 National Security Act created the National Security Council, which assisted the President on foreign policy and co-ordinated the work of the many agencies involved in foreign relations. During the Cold War, new foreign affairs agencies were placed under the general policy direction of the Secretary of State: the US Information Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the US Agency for International Development. US Department of State country missions assist in implementing the President's constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of US foreign relations. The Chief of Mission, with the title Ambassador, Minister, or Charge d'Affaires, and, the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) are responsible for and head the mission's "country team" of US Government personnel. The Country Team includes diplomatic officers representing consular, administrative, political, economic, cultural, and legal affairs, as well as all the representatives from agencies other than the Department of State. These are the people responsible for the day to day work of the mission. Department of State employees at missions comprise US-based political appointees, career diplomats, and Foreign Service nationals. The last are local residents, who provide continuity for the transient American staff and have language and cultural expertise. The Confidential US State Department Central Files, Soviet Union, Foreign Affairs, 1945-59 microfilm collection includes files relating to Soviet foreign affairs prepared for the President of the United States by this field of State Department regional experts.

Johnson , Lyndon Baines , 1908-1973 , US President Bundy , McGeorge , 1919-1996 , US public official Rostow , Walt Whitman , b 1916 , US economist

McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1961-1966

Signal Intelligence Service, US Armed Forces; Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Service, US Armed Forces; Special Branch, Military Intelligence Service, US Armed Forces

MAGIC was the codeword used by the United States to identify deciphered Japanese diplomatic communications immediately prior to and throughout World War Two. During the war, the term MAGIC was also used for deciphered Japanese military communications, as was the term TOP SECRET ULTRA. The documents in this collection are restricted to diplomatic communications. MAGIC included all decrypted messages in Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers, the most valuable of which were those encoded by the cipher machine known to the US as PURPLE. The ability to break into PURPLE meant that the Americans were able to read the most secret of Japanese diplomatic communications from before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 Dec 1941, to the end of the war in the Pacific. By way of the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, Lt Gen Hiroshi Oshima, MAGIC intelligence also provided information throughout the war about German plans and operations against the Soviet Union and the Allies. The PURPLE cipher machine was used by Japanese diplomatic and military personnel and operated by substituting ordinary typewriter keys, through a series of stepping switches and electrical matrices, into substitute letters. Theoretically, the possible substitutions by the machine cipher were endless and thus difficult to crack. Through MAGIC, however, American cryptanalysts found beachheads into Japanese ciphers from phrases used regularly and repeatedly and available in plain text. Leading the US attempt to break PURPLE was William F Friedman, a cryptanalyst who successfully broke German codes during World War One. Friedman was an expert in statistics an probability and, aided by a cryptanalyst from the US Navy, Harry L Clark, and a team of mathematicians, he successfully cracked the PURPLE code on 25 Sep 1940. Once the Freidman group enciphered PURPLE, they constructed four machines to duplicate its functions and distributed them to Washington, DC, the Philippines, and Bletchley Park, Great Britain. Upon receipt of the PURPLE machine, the British began decrypting diplomatic messages to and from Japanese embassies in Europe, the Far East and the Middle East and, by Jun 1941, had received a second machine for Singapore. Although it revealed the imminence of the war, MAGIC had little operational value. It did not reveal Pearl Harbor as a target of attack, as Japanese diplomats were often not briefed on military plans. MAGIC did, however, reveal Japanese intentions in 1941 of breaking off negotiations with Washington and London, hence indicating plans for war. Through the coded traffic of Japanese ambassador to Berlin, Hiroshi, the Allies were notified of a possible German invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, German apprehensions of waging war on more than one front, and German troop dispositions against the Allied invasion of France in Jun 1944. MAGIC's final operation of the war was its revelation to the Allies of Japan's desperate effort to secure Soviet mediation of the war in the Pacific.

US National Security Council

The National Security Act of 1947 and the Reorganization Plan of 1949 defined the composition and function of the National Security Council (NSC). Chaired by the President of the United States, the NSC consists of statutory members (the Vice President and the Secretaries of State and Defense), statutory advisers (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and professional staff members who are on temporary assignment from the armed forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, elsewhere in the government, or who have been recruited from universities and think tanks. The statutory function of the NSC is to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. Since 1947 the NSC has evolved as a key foreign policy making arm of the president. Minutes of the Meetings of the National Security Council: First Supplement contains three separate types of materials: minutes of meetings, document associated with such meetings, and summaries and discussions held during the meetings. This collection relates to a period during the administrations of Presidents Harry S Truman and Dwight David Eisenhower (1947-1956), during which the National Security Council (NSC) met on a regular weekly basis. The NSC met more frequently during times of foreign crisis, less frequently when the president was travelling or pre- occupied with domestic issues. During the administrations of Harry S Truman and Dwight David Eisenhower, the NSC produced a series of formal policy papers whose purpose it was to analyse current and potential national security issues and make policy recommendations to deal with those issues. These policy papers were prepared by the NSC staff and occasionally by members of the NSC in response to requests by the NSC to study specific issues. When completed, these policy papers (NSCPP) were distributed to the NSC for study and comment. If the NSC decided to alter a policy paper, a revised draft would be produced. Once approved, the paper became the official (and usually secret) policy of the United States government. In contrast to Truman and Eisenhower, Presidents John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson held few NSC meetings, relying less on the formally structured NSC and more on ad hoc committees to discuss national security policy.

US State Department

US Military Intelligence Division

From 1918 to 1941, the US military attaché, US Military Intelligence Division (MID), Japan, produced reports relating to Japanese military, political, social, and economic development. During this period the Japanese Empire consisted of the home islands, the former Kingdom of Korea, which was annexed in 1908, portions of Siberia, the former German Pacific island possessions seized by Japan following World War One, the dependent Kingdom of Manchukuo (Manchuria), and the occupied territories of northern China seized after 1931. The major function of the MID was the collection of military information about foreign nations. Military attachés and observers assigned to foreign countries were the principal means by which the MID collected such information. The main duties of the military attaché were to observe and report on the training, organisation, equipment, doctrine, and operations of foreign armed forces. Although the US first dispatched military attaches to foreign countries in 1889, it did not accredit an attaché to Japan until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. Two years later a second military attaché was sent out, but the Spanish-American War cut short his tenure. A permanent military attaché was finally assigned in 1901 when the US and Japan were co-operating closely in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China. For the subsequent forty years, until the Japanese attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, a US military attaché was assigned to Japan. During the period 1918-1941, the military attaché's office in Tokyo usually had two assistants and a number of 'language officers'. The latter were assigned specifically to learn Japanese whilst attached to Japanese Imperial Army regiments as observers. While the military attaché advised the US Ambassador to Japan on military matters, acted as a liaison between US Army and the Japanese Imperial Army Headquarters, and gathered and disseminated intelligence, the 'language officers' translated training and technical manuals and reported on conditions in Japanese military units.

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the United States State Department, 1942-1947

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the approximate US counterpart of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, and Special Operations Executive (SOE), with which it co-operated throughout World War Two and its immediate aftermath. The OSS was created by Presidential Military Order on 13 Jun 1942 and it functioned as the principal US intelligence organisation in all operational theatres. Its primary function was to obtain information about enemy nations and to sabotage their war potential and morale. From 1940-1942, the US had no central intelligence agency responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information bearing on national security, these services having been dispersed amongst the armed services and regional desks in the US State Department. In Jul 1941 Maj Gen William Joseph Donovan was appointed by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the civilian post of Co-ordinator of Information (COI) and was instructed to consolidate a regular channel of global strategic information. Under Donovan's leadership, the COI claimed the functions of information gathering, propaganda, espionage, subversion, and post-war planning. The overt propaganda functions of the COI were eventually severed and the COI was re-organised as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942. The OSS was instructed by the President to collect and analyse such strategic information as might be required to plan and operate special military services in theatres of operation directed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The first OSS presence in the Far East was in China, where units gathered intelligence from Chungking and the communist capital of Fushih. However, OSS operations in other Japanese occupied territories were often paralysed by differences amongst the Allies over European colonial interests in the post-war configuration of South-East Asia. Following the end of hostilities in Europe, a considerable number of OSS units were transferred from Europe to China and French Indo-China, where they established contacts with nationalist and communist partisan forces. Elsewhere in the South-East Asia theatre, the OSS trained nationals in intelligence collection, internal propaganda and unconventional warfare. The OSS was terminated by Executive Order 9620 on 20 Sep 1945, its functions later assumed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The US State Department's primary function during World War Two was to provide the US President and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff with intelligence relating to the civil structure of foreign states. During the war, the US State Department relied on OSS intelligence to prepare summary research reports concerning the social structure, strategic interests, resources, government, and economic stability of Japan and its occupied territories.

Office of Strategic Services (OSS), United States State Department

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the approximate US counterpart of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, and Special Operations Executive (SOE), with which it co-operated throughout World War Two and its immediate aftermath. The OSS was created by Presidential Military Order on 13 Jun 1942 and it functioned as the principal US intelligence organisation in all operational theatres during the war. Its primary function was to obtain information about enemy nations and to sabotage their war potential and morale. From 1940-1942, the US had no central intelligence agency responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information bearing on national security, these services having been dispersed amongst the armed services and regional desks in the US State Department. In Jul 1941 Maj Gen William Joseph Donovan was appointed by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the civilian post of Co-ordinator of Information (COI) and was instructed to consolidate a regular channel of global strategic information. The overt propaganda functions of the COI were eventually severed and the COI was re-organised as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942. The OSS was instructed by the President to collect and analyse such strategic information as might be required to plan and operate special military services in theatres of operation directed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The OSS was terminated by Executive Order 9620 on 20 Sep 1945, its functions later assumed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The US State Department's primary function immediately following World War Two was to provide the US President and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff with intelligence relating to the civil structure of foreign states and the impact of communism on post-colonial countries. In addition, the State Department provided the US Executive Branch with key intelligence concerning the economic and civil stability of nations weakened by Japanese occupation during World War Two. This enabled US policy planners to formulate long-term strategic goals in the Far East. During the war, the US State Department relied on OSS intelligence to prepare summary research reports concerning the social structure, strategic interests, resources, government, and economic stability of countries of the Far East. After the war, US embassies, State Department field offices and US foreign service personnel provided the White House with the majority of strategic intelligence relating to the Far East.

US State Department

John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, Jan 1953-Apr 1959, and Christian Archibald Herter, US Under Secretary of State, 1957- 1959 and US Secretary of State, Apr 1959-Jan 1961.

The Papers of John Foster Dulles and of Christian A Herter, 1953-1961 are microfilmed copies of telephone conversations, correspondence, memoranda, working papers, position papers and speeches of John Foster Dulles during his tenure as US Secretary of State, 1953-1959, and of Christian Archibald Herter during his tenure as US Under Secretary of State, 1953-1959 and Secretary of State, 1959-1961. Born in Washington, DC, on 25 Feb 1888, John Foster Dulles studied law and politics at Princeton University, the Sorbonne, Paris, the University of Pennsylvania, John's Hopkins University, and Harvard University. He served on the Counsel to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Versailles, 1918-1919. In 1945 he was a member of the US Delegation to the San Francisco Conference on World Organization (later the United Nations), and became a permanent delegate to the UN, 1946-1950. After the 1952 election campaign, in which Dulles attacked Democratic foreign policy as ineffective, President-elect Dwight David Eisenhower named Dulles as his Secretary of State. Together, Eisenhower and Dulles pursued a policy of containment towards the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Their 'New Look' defence policy sought to project a credible deterrent against communism through a combination of fiscal moderation, heavy reliance on nuclear weapons and a foreign policy based on threats of 'massive retaliation' in the event of a Soviet first-strike. Christian Archibald Herter was born in Paris, France, 28 Mar 1895. He served as an attaché to the American Embassy in Berlin, 1916-1917 and Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Versailles, 1918-1919. From 1929-1930 Herter was a lecturer in international politics at Harvard University. In 1957, he became Under Secretary of State and, on Dulles's death in 1959, became Secretary of State for the remainder of the Eisenhower administration.US State Department telephone conversations and correspondence, excluding those with the President, were routinely monitored by personal assistants who took shorthand notes on their content. Later, these personal assistants prepared memoranda based on the shorthand notes. Dulles's staff used these memoranda to ensure that any required action resulting from the telephone conversations and correspondence was taken. Thus, the purpose of these memoranda was purely operational. Consequently, while Dulles's personal assistants tried to be accurate and complete in their note- taking, they were not concerned about nuance or detail. The transcribers often were not familiar with the subject matter and were not trying to record history. After serving their operational purpose, the memoranda were filed and kept only as a convenient reference of the time and date of various messages. US State Department correspondence with the President, however, was rarely monitored. Therefore, the memoranda of this material originated in the Secretary of State himself. He usually dictated them, occasionally through his Special Assistants, Roderic O'Connor and John Hanes.

The Times, London

The National Security Council of the United States, 1947-1985

The National Security Act of 1947 and the Reorganization Plan of 1949 defined the composition and function of the National Security Council (NSC). Chaired by the President of the United States, the NSC consists of statutory members (the Vice President and the secretaries of State and Defense), statutory advisers (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and professional staff members who are on temporary assignment from the armed forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, elsewhere in the government, or who have been recruited from universities and think tanks. The statutory function of the NSC is to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. Since 1947 the NSC has evolved as a key foreign policy making arm of the president under such advisers as McGeorge Bundy, Dr Henry Albert Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.During the administrations of Harry S Truman and Dwight David Eisenhower, the NSC produced a series of formal policy papers whose purpose it was to analyse current and potential national security issues and make policy recommendations to deal with those issues. These policy papers were prepared by the NSC staff and occasionally by members of the NSC in response to requests by the NSC to study specific issues. When completed, these policy papers (NSCPP) were distributed to the NSC for study and comment. If the NSC decided to alter a policy paper, a revised draft would be produced. Once approved, the paper became the official (and usually secret) policy of the United States government. National Security Council Policy Papers Background Documents (NSCPPBD) consists of the background documentation used by NSC staff in preparing policy papers. These files contain memoranda, correspondence, minutes of meetings and reports by NSC members. Procedure files, 'P' files, and 'Mill' files were created during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies as a policy paper series separate and distinct from the formal NSCPP series and working papers respectively. The studies contained in the 'P' files deal with issues that required an accelerated procedure of review and action. 'Mill' papers were the working files for proposed NSC studies. National Security Council Actions (NSCA) were the records of actions, directives, and decisions made by the NSC. National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) were formal presidential directives dealing with the security affairs during the administrations of John Fitzgerald Kennedy (1961-1963) and Lyndon Baines Johnson (1963-1969). National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) was used during the administrations of Richard Milhous Nixon (1969-1974) and Gerald Rudolph Ford (1974-1977). Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM) was used during the administration of James Earl (Jimmy) Carter, Jr (1977-1981) to direct that reviews and analyses be undertaken by federal departments and agencies in regard to national security matters, while Presidential Directives (PD) were used to promulgate presidential decisions. During the presidency of Ronald Wilson Reagan (1981-1989) National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) were used to promulgate presidential decisions and National Security Study Directives (NSSD) were used to direct that studies be undertaken involving national security policy and objectives. National Security Directives (NSD) were used during the administration of George Herbert Walker Bush (1989-1993) to promulgate national security decisions. Finally, National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID) emerged in 1947 to provide guidance to the entire United States intelligence community. These directives outline the organisation, procedure, and relationships of the numerous intelligence organisations within the federal government.

US Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC; US Department of the Army, Washington, DC; Adjutant General's Office (Army), Washington, DC.

The National Security Council of the United States, 1947-1960

Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO)

US government and civilian organisations, including the US Defense Intelligence Agency, the US armed forces intelligence organisation; US Central Intelligence Agency; US Army War College; the Defense Intelligence College; US Department of State; Columbia

Project commissioned by the US government and compiled by University Publications of America, from US government reports and defence policy journals, independent scientific journals, and academic symposia and conference proceedings, 1969-1995.

FM Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig, 1914-1919

Chief of Naval Operations, US Navy; Commander, [US] Naval Forces in Europe (COMNAVEU); Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM); Adm Harold Raynsford Stark, Commander, [US] Naval Forces in Europe (COMNAVEU).

This collection includes microfilmed documents acquired by Peter Nash, a post-graduate student in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, from the Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, concerning US naval operations in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1940-1955. During World War Two, an effective US naval establishment in Europe was achieved by gradually combining pre-war naval attaché duties within those of the newly-developed Commander, US Naval Forces in Europe. In 1941, the US Navy created the Support Force of the Atlantic Fleet, which was to operate over the Northwest convoy route to Britain. With the ABC-1 Plan, Jan-Mar 1941, American, British, and Canadian representatives agreed that if the US entered the war a joint strategy would be pursued in which Germany would be the prime target. The Plan also provided for a US Northwest Escort Group and for US submarines for Gibraltar. Anglo-American naval strategy unified further still with the Navy Basic War Plan, or Rainbow 5. This plan envisaged the US working closely with Britain to effect the decisive defeat of Germany and Italy, while a defensive strategy would be maintained in the Pacific until success against the European Axis powers had been assured. Advanced by US Rear Adm Kelly Turner, the plan also formulated the Atlantic-first argument and thus ensured a close US co-ordination with Britain. In addition, Rainbow 5 gave detailed directions for the deployment of US forces to their respective military stations if the US entered the war against Germany. Gradually, a series of Special [US] Naval Officers were posted throughout Britain to liase with British naval officers on matters of naval co-operation and security. Throughout 1942, Anglo- American discussions decided the policy control and command structure for the Allied powers in the common struggle against Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would be established in Washington, DC, to determine grand strategy, and high ranking officers would represent the US whilst stationed in London. On 17 Mar 1942, Adm Harold Raynsford Stark was detached as the Chief of Naval Operations and assigned as Commander, [US] Naval Forces in Europe (COMNAVEU). As Chief of Naval Operations since 1939, he had taken the initiative in bringing about the military staff conversations between the US and British Chiefs of Staff in 1941 and was therefore considered by Adm Ernest King, Commander in Chief, US Fleet (later Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command), the most logical choice for liaison duties in Britain. His diary details the establishment of a strong Anglo- American naval working relationship. When the war in Europe ended in May 1945 there was a massive reduction of US naval forces in Britain. There was however, a wide dispersal of US occupation and naval forces to Germany, Italy, the south of France, and other former Axis territories. US Naval Forces in Europe, and later US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, exercised administrative and operational command over all US naval forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatre and was responsible for US task forces, logistics support, and naval supporting operations in this theatre, 1940-1959. US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, was established as a command under the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 Oct 1947 and gradually assumed many of the duties previously assigned to COMNAVEU, but with an expanded range. Duties included the conduct of naval operations in the Eastern Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Middle East, the support of US occupation forces in this theatre of operations, the support of US policy in these theatres, and the planning of naval and air missions in the event of a general emergency in this theatre. In February 1960, CINCNELM was dissolved and the present command of Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe, (CINCUSNAVEUR) was established.

Cabinet Office, War Cabinet

When World War Two began for Britain on 3 Sep 1939, Prime Minister Rt Hon (Arthur) Neville Chamberlain appointed an eight member strong War Cabinet. It consisted of the Prime Minister, who was the Chairman; the Chancellor of the Exchequer; the Foreign Secretary; the three service Secretaries; the Lord Privy Seal; the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence; and the Minister without Portfolio. This number increased when select non-War Cabinet Ministers were invited to attend meetings and when the Chiefs of Staff and the Permanent Under Secretary to the Treasury attended, bringing the Cabinet numbers to fifteen members. The War Cabinet met daily during the first year of the war and, as the war progressed, often met more than once a day to deal with a range of issues from military planning to food rationing. The Cabinet Minutes from Sep 1939 to May 1940 were devoted almost exclusively to the situation on the Western Front, which remained decidedly unchanged throughout the period. From May 1940, Rt Hon Winston (Leonard Spencer) Churchill, who had been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty at the outbreak of war, criticised the Chamberlain government's handling of the war and urged a more offensive British approach to the Western Front. In addition, the Allied campaign in Norway ended in disaster. Consequently, and following a debate in the House of Commons, at which 200 members voiced a non- confidence against Chamberlain, Churchill became Prime Minister and Chairman of the War Cabinet. Following the defeat of France in Jun 1940, the United Kingdom faced a severe defensive crisis and thus the War Cabinet was enlarged. Rt Hon Clement Richard Attlee; Rt Hon Arthur Greenwood; Rt Hon Robert Anthony Eden; and Rt Hon Sir John Anderson immediately entered, as would eventually Rt Hon Ernest Bevin, as Minister of Labour and National Service; Rt Hon William Maxwell Aitken, 1st Baron Beaverbrook, as Minister of Aircraft Production; Rt Hon Sir Kingsley Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer; Capt Rt Hon Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of State in the Far East; Rt Hon Sir (Richard) Stafford Cripps as Lord Privy Seal; Rt Hon Herbert Stanley Morrison as Secretary of State for Home Affairs and Minister of Home Security; and Rt Hon Frederick James Marquis, 1st Baron Woolton of Liverpool, as Minister of Reconstruction. At the end of 1940, the War Cabinet was preoccupied with the planning a unified British strategy for the waging of war, with Gen Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, often acting as a refrain to Churchill's more unconventional ideas about strategy. By mid-1941, concentration turned from the defence of Britain to intervention in Balkans, the war in North Africa, plans for providing armed forces to Europe to draw German forces from the Soviet Union, and the prospect of bringing the United States into the war. In 1942, the British persuaded US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to authorise a combined invasion of North Africa. In 1943, the War Cabinet remained pre-occupied with strategic affairs, but began to think increasingly about the post-war reconstruction of Britain and general social security measures for the British population. With a firm schedule for the Allied invasion of France firmly in place in 1943, the War Cabinet turned its attention to the post-war settlement of Europe, an Allied occupation strategy for Germany and Austria, and the post-war rehabilitation of Britain. As the war drew to a close, there began to appear increasing signs of strain between the two major parties in the British Coalition Government, which ultimately affected the War Cabinet's ability to operate effectively. On 23 May 1945, Churchill resigned as Prime Minister. On 30 May 1945, the first meeting of the new British Cabinet took place, marking the end of the War Cabinet and the return to peace-time civil procedures.

The National Security Archive, from sources at US national security agencies, principal of which were the US Aerospace Defense Command; US Department of the Air Force; US Air Force Space Command; US National Security Council; US Air Force; US General Acco

On 2 May 1946, the Research and Development Corporation (later RAND Corporation), a US non-partisan government policy guidance institution, produced a report commissioned by the US Air Force entitled 'Preliminary Design for an Experimental World Circling Spaceship'. It focused on the utility of a satellite for gathering scientific information on cosmic and terrestrial features. The report also identified potential military missions for a satellite: missile guidance, weapons delivery, weather reconnaissance, communications, attack assessment and observation. The RAND study was followed by further studies and, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, by the research and development of military space systems which centred on the provision of intelligence, launch detection, weather and navigation data and communications links. By 1991 the US military space program had developed distinct components: military space support systems, space weaponry, launch systems and launch centres, ground control facilities and the organisations for the formation and implementation of policy concerning military space operations. Military support systems represent the major component, both currently and historically, of US military space operations. The systems are used to support military and national security operations by the provision of data or establishment of vital communications links. Specific military space support functions include imaging, signals intelligence, ocean surveillance, missile launch detection, navigation, nuclear detonation detection, meteorology, geodesy, and communications and data relay relating to Soviet Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) fields, command, control, and communications centres, shipyards, ports, missile launch sites and military developments in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America. Satellites included the CORONA imaging satellite in 1960; the KH-11 electro-optical imaging satellite in 1976; ocean surveillance PARCAE satellites, 1976-1989; and, missile early warning Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS) satellites. While military support systems represent the main emphasis of the US military space program, two types of space weaponry have been under development since 1945: anti-satellite weapons and anti- missile weapons, including the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). SDI emerged under US President Ronald Wilson Reagan in 1983 and from the outset of the program, the functions of the SDI system were to identify ballistic missile launches, discriminate between warheads and decoys, track missiles, and point and fire the necessary weapons at the missiles and warheads. An element in placing military payloads in orbit is the launch system that can carry the payload and deploy it. From 1945 to 1989, the US relied on expendable launch vehicles (ELVs), and from 1990-1991 on space shuttle orbiters. US ground control consisted of inter-agency tracking and monitoring of satellite location and telemetry in ground control centres such as the Consolidated Space Test Center, Sunnyvale, CA, and the Consolidated Space Operations Center, Colorado Springs, CO. As for all areas of national security operations, the US National Security Council (NSC) was, and is, the policy making body with respect to space activity. Since 1958 it has reviewed space matters in committees and has issued policy decisions concerning military and civilian space activities. These decisions were represented by the respective Presidential, National Security Decision and National Security Directives on national space policy issued during the administrations of James Earl 'Jimmy' Carter, Jr, Ronald Wilson Reagan, and George Herbert Walker Bush. Below the NSC, organisations such as the National Reconnaissance Executive Committee were responsible for making policy decisions regarding the types of US reconnaissance satellites to be developed and their capabilities, the US Department of Defense considered matters specifically related to military space activity, and, in 1985, each of the military services formed a space organisation, under the US Space Command, to deal with space policy and operations, launch satellites, monitor foreign and US space activities and operate satellite systems.

The National Security Archive, from sources at US national security agencies, principal of which were

The microfiche collection focuses on US foreign policy towards Iran and events in Iran, 20 Jan 1977-29 Jan 1980. This period coincides with the beginning of the relationship between Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, and the US administration under President James Earl 'Jimmy' Carter, Jr, through to the failure of American policy efforts towards the revolutionary Iranian government, which became symbolised by the seizing of the US Embassy in Teheran, Iran, in which 66 Americans were taken hostage by followers of Shiite cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 4 Nov 1979. As a result of the embassy seizure, President Carter asked Cyrus Roberts Vance, US Secretary of State, to co-ordinate a secret inter-agency appraisal of US involvement in Iran since 1945. The resulting report, known as the 'White Paper', and its 12,000 pages of supporting documentation, provided the White House with an overview of US relations with an allied Iran, 1945-1978. The microfiche collection ends 29 Jan 1980, the date on which the 'White Paper' was transmitted to Zbigniew Brzezinski, US National Security Adviser, by the US State Department's Policy Planning Staff.This document collection originated from investigations done by newspaper reporter Scott Armstrong for his five-part series entitled 'The Fall of the Shah of Iran', published in the Washington Post, 25-30 Oct 1980. This newspaper series first revealed the existence of the so-called 'White Paper'. With the revelation of its existence, then researchers filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for the 'White Paper' itself and for the background documents used in its preparation. In addition, the Iranians who seized the US Embassy in Teheran captured material therein including official foreign policy memoranda and cables relating to declining relations between the US and Iran. These documents were subsequently published in Teheran, where they became known collectively as 'The Documents From the Den of Espionage', smuggled into the US, and eventually brought to the attention of Armstrong. Armstrong's subsequent five-part series of articles in the Washington Post entitled 'Iran Documents Give Rare Glimpse of a CIA Enterprise', beginning 31 Jan 1982, revealed to the public for the first time the nature of US foreign policy making in Iran 1977-1980. Documents in this microfiche collection are also from US government sources, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Finally, the US State Department's 'White Paper' and 700 supporting documents detailing US foreign policy decision making is included as are reports originating from the US Department of Defense, the US Department of Justice, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the US Army, Navy, and Air Force

The National Security Archive, from sources at US national security agencies, principal of which were the State Department, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency

Documents included in the collection relate to the US government's internal decision making process during the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962. The collection is primarily a record of executive decision making during the presidential administrations of Dwight David Eisenhower and John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and includes material generated by a broad range of agencies within the US national security bureaucracy. Particularly significant are those materials that chronicle the actions of the primary decision making bodies in the US government during the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962, the Office of the White House, the US Department of State, the US Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During the Eisenhower administration the Department of State played a central role in policy making because of the president's close working relationship with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his successor, Christian Archibald Herter. During the Kennedy administration, the State Department's role became more operational while the direction of Berlin and German policy shifted to the White House and the national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy. As the co-ordinating and policy making structure for the US military, the US Department of Defense was responsible for developing US nuclear and conventional force structures. During the Eisenhower administration, Secretaries of Defense Neil McElroy and Thomas S(overeign) Gates worked with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing recommendations on contingency planning which the President and the Secretary of State could synchronise with budget priorities. Under the Kennedy administration, Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara worked to integrate conventional forces options into Allied military planning on Berlin as well as to ensure more centralised control over US nuclear weapons in Western Europe in order to prevent accidental use. After the US occupation of West Berlin, the Central Intelligence Agency used the city as a base for intelligence operations and covert activities aimed at the Soviet bloc. The CIA tasked its Office of National Estimates (ONE) and Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) with analysing and reporting on German and Berlin developments. ONE prepared National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates on the Berlin situation which were circulated among senior officials at the Departments of State and Defense and the White House. OCI prepared weekly intelligence reports that were less analytical and included reporting on recent Berlin-related developments.

Official and semi-official missions, branches, and committees of the British Government, Dec 1945-Jun 1950

The National Security Archive, from sources at US national security agencies, principal of which were the US Department of State, US Department of Defense, US Air Force, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Strategic Air Command, Executive Office of the President

The US Nuclear History: Nuclear Arms and Politics in the Missile Age, 1955-1968 collection documents US nuclear policy decision making during the presidential administrations of Dwight David Eisenhower, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and Lyndon Baines Johnson. Through multi- billion dollar expenditures of strategic nuclear forces, command and control and communications, these administrations sought to deter threats to professed vital political and strategic interests. Between 1955 and 1968 the US strategic nuclear program grew rapidly as Washington invested billions of dollars in delivery systems designed to project thermonuclear weapons towards targets in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Much of the nuclear build-up was in the areas of Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bomber construction, the development, production and deployment of nuclear-tipped Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) designed for striking targets within minutes of launching. During the 1955-1968 period, the United States undertook its heaviest and most sustained nuclear force build-up and developed the 'overkill' capability that it, along with the Soviet Union, would maintain throughout the Cold War. By 1968, the United States had deployed more than 1,000 ICBMs in concrete silos in the Midwest States and over 640 Lockheed-built Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missiles in 41 submarines; the US Air Force was successfully testing Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) that would significantly augment the capability of ICBMs and SLBMs; and, the US Strategic Air Command fielded a bomber force of more than 600 nuclear-armed Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers. Moreover, during the 1950s and 1960s, the US government supplemented its strategic forces by deploying 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Developments in the US nuclear posture from 1955 to 1968 also included methods of command and control. To integrate the strategic plans of the US Army, Air Force and Navy, the US Department of Defense developed the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) to prepare a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Finally, to co-ordinate nuclear strike and post-strike operations, the US Air Force and the US Department of Defense developed communications and control systems linking civilian and military decision makers to incoming missile or bomber attacks. By 1968, however, the Soviet Union had deployed formidable tactical nuclear forces in Eastern Europe and eroded the US lead in strategic missiles, thus leading President Lyndon Baines Johnson to press for US-Soviet arms control negotiations.

Commander, US Naval Forces in Europe (COMNAVEU); Director of Naval History, US Navy

This collection includes microfilmed documents compiled by Peter Nash, a post-graduate student in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, from the Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, relating to US naval operations in Europe, 1941-1946. In 1946, the Commander, US Naval Forces Europe, submitted to the Director of Naval History, draft chapters of an official history of US Naval Forces in Europe that came under the command of the Special Naval Observer, London; the Commander US Naval Forces in Europe; and, the Commander US 12 Fleet. US naval representation in Britain evolved rapidly from 1941 to 1946, and eventually resulted in a close collaborative effort between the Royal Navy and the US Navy. In 1940 US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt arranged to exchange fifty over-age destroyers for US rights to establish naval bases in British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. With the ABC-1 Plan, Jan-Mar 1941, American, British, and Canadian representatives agreed that if the US entered the war a joint strategy would be pursued in which Germany would be the prime target. The Plan also provided for a US Northwest Escort Group and for US submarines for Gibraltar. Anglo-American naval strategy unified further still with the Navy Basic War Plan, or Rainbow 5. This plan envisaged the US working closely with Britain to effect the decisive defeat of Germany and Italy, while a defensive strategy would be maintained in the Pacific until success against the European Axis powers had been assured. Advanced by US Rear Adm Kelly Turner, the plan formulated the Atlantic-first argument and thus ensured a close US co-ordination with Britain. In addition, Rainbow 5 gave detailed directions for the deployment of US forces to their respective military stations if the US entered the war against Germany. For example, a Special Naval Observer in London was designated the 'Prospective Commander of US Naval Forces in North European Water' on 11 Mar 1941 and from Apr-Sep 1941, a series of Special [US] Naval Officers were posted throughout Britain to liase with British naval officers on matters of naval co-operation and security. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec 1941, elaborate plans for US naval bases in Britain were modified and many of the forces originally assigned to Europe were directed to the Pacific. Throughout 1942, however, Anglo- American discussions decided the policy control and command structure for the Allied powers in the common struggle against Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would be established in Washington, DC, to determine grand strategy, and high ranking officers would represent the US whilst stationed in London. On 17 Mar 1942, Adm Harold Raynsford Stark was detached as the Chief of Naval Operations and assigned as Commander, [US] Naval Forces in Europe. As Chief of Naval Operations since 1939, he had taken the initiative in bringing about the military staff conversations between the US and British Chiefs of Staff in 1941 and was therefore considered by Adm Ernest King, Commander in Chief, US Fleet (later Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command), the most logical choice for liaison duties in Britain. From 1942 to 1946, COMNAVEU closely determined naval strategy and operations with Admiralty and created an effective diplomatic and military liaison office, which would represent US and Allied forces in Europe. This collection includes microfilmed documents from an official history of US naval administration in the European theatre. It was written by historians selected by COMNAVEU and the Director of Naval History, based primarily on official American and British documents collected and disseminated during the war. When completed in 1946, copies of the history were sent to the US Secretary of the Navy; the US Chief of Naval Operations; the Allied-US Naval Attaché in London (ALUSNA); Commander [US] Naval Forces in Europe (COMNAVEU); Commander [US] Naval Forces Germany (COMNAVFORGER); and Commander [US] Naval Forces Mediterranean (COMNAVMED).

The National Security Archive, from sources at US national security agencies, principal of which were the National Security Council, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

American Military Tribunal III

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