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Lever , George Harold , 1892-1973 , Captain

Hart , Sir , Basil Henry Liddell , 1895-1970 , Knight , Captain , military historian

Born in Paris in 1895; educated at St Paul's London and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge; commissioned into the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1914; served in World War One, in Ypres and the Somme, 1914-1918; selected for the Royal Tank Corps, but invalided and retired on half pay, 1924; retired from the army as Capt, 1927; military correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, 1925-1935 and The Times, 1935-1939; author 1918-1970; personal adviser to Leslie Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War, 1937-1938; died in 1970. Publications: Author of the following unless otherwise stated: New methods in infantry training (University Press, Cambridge, 1918); The framework of a science of infantry tactics (Hugh Rees, London, 1921) reprinted as A science of infantry tactics simplified (W Clowes and Sons, London, 1923, 1926); Paris, or the future of war (Kegan Paul and Co, London, 1925); The lawn tennis masters unveiled (Arrowsmith, London, 1926); A greater than Napoleon - Scipio Africanus (W Blackwood and Sons, London, 1926); The remaking of modern armies (John Murray, London, 1927); Great captains unveiled (W Blackwood and Sons, London, 1927 and Cedric Chivers, Bath, 1971); Reputations (John Murray, London, 1928); Reputations - ten years after (Little, Brown and Co, Boston, 1928); The decisive wars of history (G Bell and Sons, London, 1929) reprinted as The strategy of indirect approach (Faber and Faber, London, 1941, 1946), The way to win wars (Faber and Faber, London, 1943) and Strategy - the indirect approach (Faber and Faber, London, 1954, 1967); Sherman (Dodd, Mead and Co, New York, 1929, Ernest Benn, London, 1930, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1933 and Stevens and Sons, London, 1959); The real war 1914-1918 (Faber and Faber, London, 1930) reprinted as A history of the World War 1914-1918 (Faber and Faber, London, 1934, Cassell, London, 1970 and Pan, London, 1972); Foch (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1931 and Penguin, London, 1937); The British way in warfare (Faber and Faber, London, 1932) reprinted as When Britain goes to war (Faber and Faber, London, 1935) and The British way in warfare (Harmondsworth, New York, 1942); The future of infantry (Faber and Faber, London, 1933); The ghost of Napoleon (Faber and Faber, London, 1933); T E Lawrence - in Arabia and after (Jonathan Cape, London, 1934, enlarged edition 1935); The war in outline 1914-1918 (Faber and Faber, London, 1936); co-author of Lawrence of Arabia(Corvinus Press, London, 1936); Europe in arms (Faber and Faber, London, 1937)Through the fog of war (Faber and Faber, London, 1938); We learn from history that we do not learn from history (University College, London, 1938); editor of The next war (Geoffrey Bles, London, 1938); editor of T E Lawrence to his biographer, Liddell Hart (Doubleday, Doran and Co, New York, 1938); The defence of Britain (Faber and Faber, London, 1939); Dynamic defence (Faber and Faber, London, 1940); The current of war (Hutchinson and Co, London ,1941); This expanding war (Faber and Faber, London, 1942); Why don't we learn from history? (G Allen and Unwin, London, 1944 and Allen and Unwin, London, 1972); Thoughts on war (Faber and Faber, London, 1944); Free man or state slave (No Conscription Council, London, 1946); Revolution in warfare (Faber and Faber, London, 1946); The other side of the hill (Cassell and Co, London, 1948, 1951 and 1973 and Hamilton and Co, 1956); Defence of the west (Cassell and Co, London, 1950); editor of the Letters of Private Wheeler (Michael Joseph, London, 1951); editor of The Rommel papers (Collins, London, 1953); T E Lawrence of Arabia and Clouds Hill (1955); editor of The Soviet Army (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1956); The tanks - the history of the Royal Tank Regiment (Cassell, London, 1959); Deterrent or defence (Stevens and Sons, London, 1960); editor of From Atlanta to the sea (Folio Society, London, 1961); Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart (Cassell, London, 1965); co-author of Churchill (Allen Lane the Penguin Press, London, 1969); History of the Second World War (Cassell, London, 1970 and Pan Books, London, 1973); military editor of the 14th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Lummis , Eric Templeton , 1920-1999 , Lieutenant Colonel Lummis , William Murrell , 1885-1985 , military historian , canon , Captain

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Marriott , John Horace , 1916-2007 , Lieutenant Colonel

Smedley , John Bertram Aubrey Marsden , [1893]-1959 , Commander RN

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McEwan , Ian Paton , 1917-2003 , Lieutenant Commander

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Messenger , William de Lemos Milles , 1913-2005 , Colonel

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The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1946-1953

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) committee was the principal US inter-service body which, together with the British Chiefs of Staff, formed the Combined Chiefs of Staff committee, the supreme Anglo- American military strategic and operational authority, 1942-1945. With the formation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in Dec 1941 it became necessary to form an American agency with comparable decision making structure to that of the British Chiefs of Staff (COS). This was formally inaugurated in Feb 1942 as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) committee, its first members being Gen George Catlett Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff , Adm Harold Raynsford Stark and Adm Ernest Joseph King, US Navy, and Lt Gen Henry H 'Hap' Arnold, US Army Air Forces. In Jul 1942, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed Adm William D Leahy as his political and military representative and Chief of Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee. Unlike the British Chiefs of Staff (COS), which was integrated into the British Cabinet system, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff was responsible primarily to the President of the United States as Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces. Under Leahy's leadership, the Joint Chiefs of Staff became the centre of the US executive command structure during World War Two and was responsible for operational strategy in the Pacific, the co-ordination of US military operations in the Far East, and the planning and co-ordination of US operational strategy elsewhere. In addition, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff functioned together under the auspices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to plan Allied strategic and operational efforts in Europe, North Africa, and the Far East. Following World War Two, the need for a formal structure of US joint command was apparent and the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff offered a workable model. The first legislative step was the passage of the National Security Act in 1947, which formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 10 Aug 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff became a US statutory agency and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), became the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff included the Chief of Staff, US Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, and the Commandant, US Marine Corps. The chiefs were able to respond to a request or voluntarily submit, through the Chairman, advice or opinion to the President, the Secretary of State, or the National Security Council, but they had no executive authority to commit combatant forces. In addition to their responsibilities on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military service chiefs were responsible to the secretaries of their military departments for management of the services as they prepared and directed unified and other combat commands under the Secretary of Defense.

Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Special Operations Branch, London, and Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Secret Intelligence Branch, London

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the approximate US counterpart of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, and Special Operations Executive (SOE), with which it co-operated throughout World War Two and its immediate aftermath. The OSS was created by Presidential Military Order on 13 Jun 1942 and it functioned as the principal US intelligence organisation in all operational theatres. Its primary function was to obtain information about enemy nations and to sabotage their war potential and morale. From 1940-1942, the US had no central intelligence agency responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information bearing on national security, these services having been dispersed amongst the armed services and regional desks in the US State Department. In Jul 1941 Maj Gen William Joseph Donovan was appointed by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the civilian post of Co-ordinator of Information (COI) and was instructed to consolidate a regular channel of global strategic information. Under Donovan's leadership, the COI claimed the functions of information gathering, propaganda, espionage, subversion, and post-war planning. The overt propaganda functions of the COI were eventually severed and the COI was re-organised as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942. The OSS was instructed by the President to collect and analyse such strategic information as might be required to plan and operate special military services in theatres of operation directed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The headquarters of the OSS were in Washington, but is also maintained overseas outposts which engaged in information gathering and liaison operations with Allied intelligence services, most notably Special Operations Executive (SOE). Chief among the overseas units was the London Outpost, established at the end of 1941 to facilitate co-operation between the Allied intelligence services, and to serve as a base of operations for Allied intelligence, espionage and operational activities in Europe. The Special Operations (SO) Branch, OSS, London, was charged with conducting sabotage operations, support and supply of resistance groups, and guerrilla warfare in enemy-occupied territories. The 'London Group' of SOE was its British counterpart. On 10 Jan 1944, the SO Branch and the London Group were integrated into Special Forces Headquarters, under which they were charged with carrying on their operations. Thus, from Jan-Sep 1944, 93 Jedburgh teams, consisting of one British SOE soldier, one American OSS soldier, and one officer native to the country in which the team would operate, were parachuted into occupied Western Europe to supply resistance movements and co-ordinate operations. The purpose of the Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch, OSS, London, was to collect and analyse strategic intelligence as was required by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The OSS was terminated by Executive Order 9620 on 20 Sep 1945, its functions later assumed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Dean Gooderham Acheson, US Secretary of State, 1949-1953.

US State Department

The National Security Council of the United States, 1947-1985

The National Security Act of 1947 and the Reorganization Plan of 1949 defined the composition and function of the National Security Council (NSC). Chaired by the President of the United States, the NSC consists of statutory members (the Vice President and the secretaries of State and Defense), statutory advisers (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and professional staff members who are on temporary assignment from the armed forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, elsewhere in the government, or who have been recruited from universities and think tanks. The statutory function of the NSC is to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. Since 1947 the NSC has evolved as a key foreign policy making arm of the president under such advisers as McGeorge Bundy, Dr Henry Albert Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.During the administrations of Harry S Truman and Dwight David Eisenhower, the NSC produced a series of formal policy papers whose purpose it was to analyse current and potential national security issues and make policy recommendations to deal with those issues. These policy papers were prepared by the NSC staff and occasionally by members of the NSC in response to requests by the NSC to study specific issues. When completed, these policy papers (NSCPP) were distributed to the NSC for study and comment. If the NSC decided to alter a policy paper, a revised draft would be produced. Once approved, the paper became the official (and usually secret) policy of the United States government. National Security Council Policy Papers Background Documents (NSCPPBD) consists of the background documentation used by NSC staff in preparing policy papers. These files contain memoranda, correspondence, minutes of meetings and reports by NSC members. Procedure files, 'P' files, and 'Mill' files were created during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies as a policy paper series separate and distinct from the formal NSCPP series and working papers respectively. The studies contained in the 'P' files deal with issues that required an accelerated procedure of review and action. 'Mill' papers were the working files for proposed NSC studies. National Security Council Actions (NSCA) were the records of actions, directives, and decisions made by the NSC. National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) were formal presidential directives dealing with the security affairs during the administrations of John Fitzgerald Kennedy (1961-1963) and Lyndon Baines Johnson (1963-1969). National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) was used during the administrations of Richard Milhous Nixon (1969-1974) and Gerald Rudolph Ford (1974-1977). Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM) was used during the administration of James Earl (Jimmy) Carter, Jr (1977-1981) to direct that reviews and analyses be undertaken by federal departments and agencies in regard to national security matters, while Presidential Directives (PD) were used to promulgate presidential decisions. During the presidency of Ronald Wilson Reagan (1981-1989) National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) were used to promulgate presidential decisions and National Security Study Directives (NSSD) were used to direct that studies be undertaken involving national security policy and objectives. National Security Directives (NSD) were used during the administration of George Herbert Walker Bush (1989-1993) to promulgate national security decisions. Finally, National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID) emerged in 1947 to provide guidance to the entire United States intelligence community. These directives outline the organisation, procedure, and relationships of the numerous intelligence organisations within the federal government.

Project commissioned by the US government and compiled by University Publications of America, from US government reports and defence policy journals, independent scientific journals, and academic symposia and conference proceedings, 1969-1995.

Chief of Naval Operations, US Navy; Commander, [US] Naval Forces in Europe (COMNAVEU); Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM); Adm Harold Raynsford Stark, Commander, [US] Naval Forces in Europe (COMNAVEU).

This collection includes microfilmed documents acquired by Peter Nash, a post-graduate student in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, from the Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, concerning US naval operations in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1940-1955. During World War Two, an effective US naval establishment in Europe was achieved by gradually combining pre-war naval attaché duties within those of the newly-developed Commander, US Naval Forces in Europe. In 1941, the US Navy created the Support Force of the Atlantic Fleet, which was to operate over the Northwest convoy route to Britain. With the ABC-1 Plan, Jan-Mar 1941, American, British, and Canadian representatives agreed that if the US entered the war a joint strategy would be pursued in which Germany would be the prime target. The Plan also provided for a US Northwest Escort Group and for US submarines for Gibraltar. Anglo-American naval strategy unified further still with the Navy Basic War Plan, or Rainbow 5. This plan envisaged the US working closely with Britain to effect the decisive defeat of Germany and Italy, while a defensive strategy would be maintained in the Pacific until success against the European Axis powers had been assured. Advanced by US Rear Adm Kelly Turner, the plan also formulated the Atlantic-first argument and thus ensured a close US co-ordination with Britain. In addition, Rainbow 5 gave detailed directions for the deployment of US forces to their respective military stations if the US entered the war against Germany. Gradually, a series of Special [US] Naval Officers were posted throughout Britain to liase with British naval officers on matters of naval co-operation and security. Throughout 1942, Anglo- American discussions decided the policy control and command structure for the Allied powers in the common struggle against Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would be established in Washington, DC, to determine grand strategy, and high ranking officers would represent the US whilst stationed in London. On 17 Mar 1942, Adm Harold Raynsford Stark was detached as the Chief of Naval Operations and assigned as Commander, [US] Naval Forces in Europe (COMNAVEU). As Chief of Naval Operations since 1939, he had taken the initiative in bringing about the military staff conversations between the US and British Chiefs of Staff in 1941 and was therefore considered by Adm Ernest King, Commander in Chief, US Fleet (later Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command), the most logical choice for liaison duties in Britain. His diary details the establishment of a strong Anglo- American naval working relationship. When the war in Europe ended in May 1945 there was a massive reduction of US naval forces in Britain. There was however, a wide dispersal of US occupation and naval forces to Germany, Italy, the south of France, and other former Axis territories. US Naval Forces in Europe, and later US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, exercised administrative and operational command over all US naval forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatre and was responsible for US task forces, logistics support, and naval supporting operations in this theatre, 1940-1959. US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, was established as a command under the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 Oct 1947 and gradually assumed many of the duties previously assigned to COMNAVEU, but with an expanded range. Duties included the conduct of naval operations in the Eastern Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Middle East, the support of US occupation forces in this theatre of operations, the support of US policy in these theatres, and the planning of naval and air missions in the event of a general emergency in this theatre. In February 1960, CINCNELM was dissolved and the present command of Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe, (CINCUSNAVEUR) was established.

Cabinet Office, War Cabinet

When World War Two began for Britain on 3 Sep 1939, Prime Minister Rt Hon (Arthur) Neville Chamberlain appointed an eight member strong War Cabinet. It consisted of the Prime Minister, who was the Chairman; the Chancellor of the Exchequer; the Foreign Secretary; the three service Secretaries; the Lord Privy Seal; the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence; and the Minister without Portfolio. This number increased when select non-War Cabinet Ministers were invited to attend meetings and when the Chiefs of Staff and the Permanent Under Secretary to the Treasury attended, bringing the Cabinet numbers to fifteen members. The War Cabinet met daily during the first year of the war and, as the war progressed, often met more than once a day to deal with a range of issues from military planning to food rationing. The Cabinet Minutes from Sep 1939 to May 1940 were devoted almost exclusively to the situation on the Western Front, which remained decidedly unchanged throughout the period. From May 1940, Rt Hon Winston (Leonard Spencer) Churchill, who had been appointed First Lord of the Admiralty at the outbreak of war, criticised the Chamberlain government's handling of the war and urged a more offensive British approach to the Western Front. In addition, the Allied campaign in Norway ended in disaster. Consequently, and following a debate in the House of Commons, at which 200 members voiced a non- confidence against Chamberlain, Churchill became Prime Minister and Chairman of the War Cabinet. Following the defeat of France in Jun 1940, the United Kingdom faced a severe defensive crisis and thus the War Cabinet was enlarged. Rt Hon Clement Richard Attlee; Rt Hon Arthur Greenwood; Rt Hon Robert Anthony Eden; and Rt Hon Sir John Anderson immediately entered, as would eventually Rt Hon Ernest Bevin, as Minister of Labour and National Service; Rt Hon William Maxwell Aitken, 1st Baron Beaverbrook, as Minister of Aircraft Production; Rt Hon Sir Kingsley Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer; Capt Rt Hon Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of State in the Far East; Rt Hon Sir (Richard) Stafford Cripps as Lord Privy Seal; Rt Hon Herbert Stanley Morrison as Secretary of State for Home Affairs and Minister of Home Security; and Rt Hon Frederick James Marquis, 1st Baron Woolton of Liverpool, as Minister of Reconstruction. At the end of 1940, the War Cabinet was preoccupied with the planning a unified British strategy for the waging of war, with Gen Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, often acting as a refrain to Churchill's more unconventional ideas about strategy. By mid-1941, concentration turned from the defence of Britain to intervention in Balkans, the war in North Africa, plans for providing armed forces to Europe to draw German forces from the Soviet Union, and the prospect of bringing the United States into the war. In 1942, the British persuaded US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to authorise a combined invasion of North Africa. In 1943, the War Cabinet remained pre-occupied with strategic affairs, but began to think increasingly about the post-war reconstruction of Britain and general social security measures for the British population. With a firm schedule for the Allied invasion of France firmly in place in 1943, the War Cabinet turned its attention to the post-war settlement of Europe, an Allied occupation strategy for Germany and Austria, and the post-war rehabilitation of Britain. As the war drew to a close, there began to appear increasing signs of strain between the two major parties in the British Coalition Government, which ultimately affected the War Cabinet's ability to operate effectively. On 23 May 1945, Churchill resigned as Prime Minister. On 30 May 1945, the first meeting of the new British Cabinet took place, marking the end of the War Cabinet and the return to peace-time civil procedures.

Official and semi-official missions, branches, and committees of the British Government, Dec 1945-Jun 1950

The National Security Archive, from sources at US national security agencies, principal of which were the US Department of State, US Department of Defense, US Air Force, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Strategic Air Command, Executive Office of the President

The US Nuclear History: Nuclear Arms and Politics in the Missile Age, 1955-1968 collection documents US nuclear policy decision making during the presidential administrations of Dwight David Eisenhower, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and Lyndon Baines Johnson. Through multi- billion dollar expenditures of strategic nuclear forces, command and control and communications, these administrations sought to deter threats to professed vital political and strategic interests. Between 1955 and 1968 the US strategic nuclear program grew rapidly as Washington invested billions of dollars in delivery systems designed to project thermonuclear weapons towards targets in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Much of the nuclear build-up was in the areas of Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bomber construction, the development, production and deployment of nuclear-tipped Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) designed for striking targets within minutes of launching. During the 1955-1968 period, the United States undertook its heaviest and most sustained nuclear force build-up and developed the 'overkill' capability that it, along with the Soviet Union, would maintain throughout the Cold War. By 1968, the United States had deployed more than 1,000 ICBMs in concrete silos in the Midwest States and over 640 Lockheed-built Polaris Fleet Ballistic Missiles in 41 submarines; the US Air Force was successfully testing Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) that would significantly augment the capability of ICBMs and SLBMs; and, the US Strategic Air Command fielded a bomber force of more than 600 nuclear-armed Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers. Moreover, during the 1950s and 1960s, the US government supplemented its strategic forces by deploying 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Developments in the US nuclear posture from 1955 to 1968 also included methods of command and control. To integrate the strategic plans of the US Army, Air Force and Navy, the US Department of Defense developed the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) to prepare a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Finally, to co-ordinate nuclear strike and post-strike operations, the US Air Force and the US Department of Defense developed communications and control systems linking civilian and military decision makers to incoming missile or bomber attacks. By 1968, however, the Soviet Union had deployed formidable tactical nuclear forces in Eastern Europe and eroded the US lead in strategic missiles, thus leading President Lyndon Baines Johnson to press for US-Soviet arms control negotiations.

Commander, US Naval Forces in Europe (COMNAVEU); Director of Naval History, US Navy

This collection includes microfilmed documents compiled by Peter Nash, a post-graduate student in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, from the Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, relating to US naval operations in Europe, 1941-1946. In 1946, the Commander, US Naval Forces Europe, submitted to the Director of Naval History, draft chapters of an official history of US Naval Forces in Europe that came under the command of the Special Naval Observer, London; the Commander US Naval Forces in Europe; and, the Commander US 12 Fleet. US naval representation in Britain evolved rapidly from 1941 to 1946, and eventually resulted in a close collaborative effort between the Royal Navy and the US Navy. In 1940 US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt arranged to exchange fifty over-age destroyers for US rights to establish naval bases in British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. With the ABC-1 Plan, Jan-Mar 1941, American, British, and Canadian representatives agreed that if the US entered the war a joint strategy would be pursued in which Germany would be the prime target. The Plan also provided for a US Northwest Escort Group and for US submarines for Gibraltar. Anglo-American naval strategy unified further still with the Navy Basic War Plan, or Rainbow 5. This plan envisaged the US working closely with Britain to effect the decisive defeat of Germany and Italy, while a defensive strategy would be maintained in the Pacific until success against the European Axis powers had been assured. Advanced by US Rear Adm Kelly Turner, the plan formulated the Atlantic-first argument and thus ensured a close US co-ordination with Britain. In addition, Rainbow 5 gave detailed directions for the deployment of US forces to their respective military stations if the US entered the war against Germany. For example, a Special Naval Observer in London was designated the 'Prospective Commander of US Naval Forces in North European Water' on 11 Mar 1941 and from Apr-Sep 1941, a series of Special [US] Naval Officers were posted throughout Britain to liase with British naval officers on matters of naval co-operation and security. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec 1941, elaborate plans for US naval bases in Britain were modified and many of the forces originally assigned to Europe were directed to the Pacific. Throughout 1942, however, Anglo- American discussions decided the policy control and command structure for the Allied powers in the common struggle against Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would be established in Washington, DC, to determine grand strategy, and high ranking officers would represent the US whilst stationed in London. On 17 Mar 1942, Adm Harold Raynsford Stark was detached as the Chief of Naval Operations and assigned as Commander, [US] Naval Forces in Europe. As Chief of Naval Operations since 1939, he had taken the initiative in bringing about the military staff conversations between the US and British Chiefs of Staff in 1941 and was therefore considered by Adm Ernest King, Commander in Chief, US Fleet (later Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command), the most logical choice for liaison duties in Britain. From 1942 to 1946, COMNAVEU closely determined naval strategy and operations with Admiralty and created an effective diplomatic and military liaison office, which would represent US and Allied forces in Europe. This collection includes microfilmed documents from an official history of US naval administration in the European theatre. It was written by historians selected by COMNAVEU and the Director of Naval History, based primarily on official American and British documents collected and disseminated during the war. When completed in 1946, copies of the history were sent to the US Secretary of the Navy; the US Chief of Naval Operations; the Allied-US Naval Attaché in London (ALUSNA); Commander [US] Naval Forces in Europe (COMNAVEU); Commander [US] Naval Forces Germany (COMNAVFORGER); and Commander [US] Naval Forces Mediterranean (COMNAVMED).

Soviet military personnel, strategists, and military analysts

Historical Detachments, US Army

Milne , George Francis , 1866-1948 , 1st Baron Milne of Salonika and of Rubislaw, County Aberdeen , Field Marshal

Born, 1866; educated at the Gymnasium, Old Aberdeen, and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich; commissioned into the Royal Artillery, 1885; service with 1/Q Battery (renumbered 38 Battery in 1889), Royal Field Artillery, Trimulgherri, India, 1885-1889; service with D Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, Aldershot, Hampshire, 1889-1891; service with C Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, Meerut, India, 1891-1895; Capt, 1895; service with 2 Company, Southern Division, Royal Garrison Artillery, Malta, 1895-1896; Battery Capt, 37 Battery, Royal Field Artillery, Hilsea, Portsmouth, Hampshire, 1896-1897; service in the Sudan, 1898; Battle of Omdurman, Sudan, Sep 1898; graduated from Staff College, Camberley, Surrey, 1899; served in Second Boer War, South Africa, 1899-1902; Maj, 1900; Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, South Africa, 1900-1902; Brevet Lt Col, 1902; awarded DSO, 1902; Deputy Quartermaster General (Intelligence) and General Staff Officer 2, Army Headquarters, 1903-1907; Brevet Col, 1905; Officer Commanding, 59 Battery, Royal Field Artillery, Brighton, Sussex, 1907-1908; General Staff Officer 2, North Midland Div, Territorial Force, Northern Command, Lichfield, Staffordshire, 1908-1909; Col, 1909; General Staff Officer 1, 6 Div, Irish Command, Cork, 1909-1913; awarded CB, 1912; Brig Gen, Royal Artillery, 4 Div, Eastern Command, Woolwich, 1913-1914; served in World War One, 1914-1918; Brig Gen, Royal Artillery, 4 Div, BEF (British Expeditionary Force), France, 1914-1915; Brig Gen, General Staff, 3 Corps, BEF (British Expeditionary Force), France, 1915; Maj Gen, 1915; Maj Gen, General Staff, 2 Army, BEF, Western Front, 1915; General Officer Commanding 27 Div, BEF, France, and Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, Macedonia, 1915; temporary Lt Gen, 1915; General Officer Commanding 16 Corps, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, Salonika, 1915-1916; General Officer Commanding-in-Chief British Salonika Force and British Army of the Black Sea, 1916-1920; Lt Gen, 1917; created KCB, 1918; temporary Gen, 1918-1920; Col Commandant, Royal Artillery, 1918-1948; created KCMG, 1919; created GCMG, 1919; Gen, 1920; Lieutenant of the Tower of London, 1920-1923; Freeman of the City of Aberdeen, 1921; General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command, 1923-1926; Aide de Camp General to HM King George V, 1923-1927; Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1926-1933; created GCB, 1927; FM, 1928; Master Gunner, St James's Park, 1929-1946; retired, 1933; created 1st Baron Milne of Salonika and Rubislaw, County Aberdeen, 1933; Governor and Constable of the Tower of London, 1933-1938; served in World War Two, 1939-1945; service in the Home Guard and Civil Defence, 1940-1944; Col Commandant, Pioneer Corps, 1940-1945; military correspondent for The Sunday Chronicle, 1941-1944; died, 1948.

Milton , David John , 1934-1998 , Colonel

Geographical Section, General Staff; War Office; Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence; German General Staff

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