The Potsdam Conference, 17 Jul 1945-2 Aug 1945, was the meeting of the principal Allies of World War Two, the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Great Britain, to clarify and implement agreements reached previously at the Yalta Conference, 4-11 Feb 1945. The chief representatives were US President Harry S Truman, Soviet Premier Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, British Prime Minister Rt Hon Winston (Leonard Spencer) Churchill and, after Churchill's defeat in the British general elections, Rt Hon Clement Richard Attlee. The representatives agreed to transfer the chief authority in Germany to the American, British, Soviet, and French military commanders in their respective zones of occupation and to a four-power Allied Control Council for matters regarding the whole of Germany. The Allies set up a new system of rule for Germany which outlawed the Nazi Party, disarmed Germany, and introduced representative and elective principles of government. The German economy was to be decentralised, and monopolies dismantled. The question of Polish sovereignty was discussed, and all former German territory east of the Oder and Neisse rivers was transferred to Polish and Soviet administration, pending a final peace treaty. The German population in these territories was to be transferred to Germany and a mode of reparations payments was outlined.. Finally, the Potsdam Declaration, 26 Jul 1945, presented an ultimatum to Japan, offering the nation the choice between unconditional surrender and total destruction. The material in this collection contains President Harry S Truman's diary and official papers relating to the Potsdam Conference, 29 Mar-2 Aug 1945.
The presidential administration of Lyndon Baines Johnson (1963-69) represents a significant period in the history of US foreign policy. The 1960s marked the height post-World War Two globalism and Johnson inherited from his predecessors world-wide obligations and a host of complex problems. In addition to the Vietnam War, he faced major crises in Panama, the Dominican Republic and the Middle East, as well as concerns about apartheid in South Africa, the coup d'état in Brazil, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Although the Cold War shaped US responses to these crises and continued to influence US foreign policy in general, new approaches were devised toward the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the major adversaries of the United States, as well as towards the Third World and Latin America. The 'Country Files' were maintained in the White House by McGeorge Bundy and Walt Whitman Rostow, national security advisors to the president. Bundy and Rostow monitored the daily cable traffic through the White House Situation Room and co-ordinated the flow of intelligence and information to the president, determining what items should be brought to this attention. They served as liaison officers with the departments and agencies involved in foreign policy, reviewing recommendations sent to the President by these groups and monitoring their daily operations to ensure that policies were co-ordinated and decisions implemented.
From 1918 to 1941, the US military attaché, US Military Intelligence Division (MID), Japan, produced reports relating to Japanese military, political, social, and economic development. During this period the Japanese Empire consisted of the home islands, the former Kingdom of Korea, which was annexed in 1908, portions of Siberia, the former German Pacific island possessions seized by Japan following World War One, the dependent Kingdom of Manchukuo (Manchuria), and the occupied territories of northern China seized after 1931. The major function of the MID was the collection of military information about foreign nations. Military attachés and observers assigned to foreign countries were the principal means by which the MID collected such information. The main duties of the military attaché were to observe and report on the training, organisation, equipment, doctrine, and operations of foreign armed forces. Although the US first dispatched military attaches to foreign countries in 1889, it did not accredit an attaché to Japan until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894. Two years later a second military attaché was sent out, but the Spanish-American War cut short his tenure. A permanent military attaché was finally assigned in 1901 when the US and Japan were co-operating closely in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China. For the subsequent forty years, until the Japanese attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, a US military attaché was assigned to Japan. During the period 1918-1941, the military attaché's office in Tokyo usually had two assistants and a number of 'language officers'. The latter were assigned specifically to learn Japanese whilst attached to Japanese Imperial Army regiments as observers. While the military attaché advised the US Ambassador to Japan on military matters, acted as a liaison between US Army and the Japanese Imperial Army Headquarters, and gathered and disseminated intelligence, the 'language officers' translated training and technical manuals and reported on conditions in Japanese military units.
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the approximate US counterpart of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, and Special Operations Executive (SOE), with which it co-operated throughout World War Two and its immediate aftermath. The OSS was created by Presidential Military Order on 13 Jun 1942 and it functioned as the principal US intelligence organisation in all operational theatres. Its primary function was to obtain information about enemy nations and to sabotage their war potential and morale. From 1940-1942, the US had no central intelligence agency responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information bearing on national security, these services having been dispersed amongst the armed services and regional desks in the US State Department. In Jul 1941 Maj Gen William Joseph Donovan was appointed by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the civilian post of Co-ordinator of Information (COI) and was instructed to consolidate a regular channel of global strategic information. Under Donovan's leadership, the COI claimed the functions of information gathering, propaganda, espionage, subversion, and post-war planning. The overt propaganda functions of the COI were eventually severed and the COI was re-organised as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942. The OSS was instructed by the President to collect and analyse such strategic information as might be required to plan and operate special military services in theatres of operation directed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The first OSS presence in the Far East was in China, where units gathered intelligence from Chungking and the communist capital of Fushih. However, OSS operations in other Japanese occupied territories were often paralysed by differences amongst the Allies over European colonial interests in the post-war configuration of South-East Asia. Following the end of hostilities in Europe, a considerable number of OSS units were transferred from Europe to China and French Indo-China, where they established contacts with nationalist and communist partisan forces. Elsewhere in the South-East Asia theatre, the OSS trained nationals in intelligence collection, internal propaganda and unconventional warfare. The OSS was terminated by Executive Order 9620 on 20 Sep 1945, its functions later assumed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The US State Department's primary function during World War Two was to provide the US President and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff with intelligence relating to the civil structure of foreign states. During the war, the US State Department relied on OSS intelligence to prepare summary research reports concerning the social structure, strategic interests, resources, government, and economic stability of Japan and its occupied territories.
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the approximate US counterpart of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, and Special Operations Executive (SOE), with which it co-operated throughout World War Two and its immediate aftermath. The OSS was created by Presidential Military Order on 13 Jun 1942 and it functioned as the principal US intelligence organisation in all operational theatres during the war. Its primary function was to obtain information about enemy nations and to sabotage their war potential and morale. From 1940-1942, the US had no central intelligence agency responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information bearing on national security, these services having been dispersed amongst the armed services and regional desks in the US State Department. In Jul 1941 Maj Gen William Joseph Donovan was appointed by US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the civilian post of Co-ordinator of Information (COI) and was instructed to consolidate a regular channel of global strategic information. The overt propaganda functions of the COI were eventually severed and the COI was re-organised as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942. The OSS was instructed by the President to collect and analyse such strategic information as might be required to plan and operate special military services in theatres of operation directed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The OSS was terminated by Executive Order 9620 on 20 Sep 1945, its functions later assumed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The US State Department's primary function immediately following World War Two was to provide the US President and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff with intelligence relating to the civil structure of foreign states and the impact of communism on post-colonial countries. In addition, the State Department provided the US Executive Branch with key intelligence concerning the economic and civil stability of nations weakened by Japanese occupation during World War Two. This enabled US policy planners to formulate long-term strategic goals in the Far East. During the war, the US State Department relied on OSS intelligence to prepare summary research reports concerning the social structure, strategic interests, resources, government, and economic stability of countries of the Far East. After the war, US embassies, State Department field offices and US foreign service personnel provided the White House with the majority of strategic intelligence relating to the Far East.
The National Security Act of 1947 and the Reorganization Plan of 1949 defined the composition and function of the National Security Council (NSC). Chaired by the President of the United States, the NSC consists of statutory members (the Vice President and the secretaries of State and Defense), statutory advisers (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and professional staff members who are on temporary assignment from the armed forces, the Central Intelligence Agency, elsewhere in the government, or who have been recruited from universities and think tanks. The statutory function of the NSC is to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. Since 1947 the NSC has evolved as a key foreign policy making arm of the president under such advisers as McGeorge Bundy, Dr Henry Albert Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.During the administrations of Harry S Truman and Dwight David Eisenhower, the NSC produced a series of formal policy papers whose purpose it was to analyse current and potential national security issues and make policy recommendations to deal with those issues. These policy papers were prepared by the NSC staff and occasionally by members of the NSC in response to requests by the NSC to study specific issues. When completed, these policy papers (NSCPP) were distributed to the NSC for study and comment. If the NSC decided to alter a policy paper, a revised draft would be produced. Once approved, the paper became the official (and usually secret) policy of the United States government. National Security Council Policy Papers Background Documents (NSCPPBD) consists of the background documentation used by NSC staff in preparing policy papers. These files contain memoranda, correspondence, minutes of meetings and reports by NSC members. Procedure files, 'P' files, and 'Mill' files were created during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies as a policy paper series separate and distinct from the formal NSCPP series and working papers respectively. The studies contained in the 'P' files deal with issues that required an accelerated procedure of review and action. 'Mill' papers were the working files for proposed NSC studies. National Security Council Actions (NSCA) were the records of actions, directives, and decisions made by the NSC. National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM) were formal presidential directives dealing with the security affairs during the administrations of John Fitzgerald Kennedy (1961-1963) and Lyndon Baines Johnson (1963-1969). National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) was used during the administrations of Richard Milhous Nixon (1969-1974) and Gerald Rudolph Ford (1974-1977). Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM) was used during the administration of James Earl (Jimmy) Carter, Jr (1977-1981) to direct that reviews and analyses be undertaken by federal departments and agencies in regard to national security matters, while Presidential Directives (PD) were used to promulgate presidential decisions. During the presidency of Ronald Wilson Reagan (1981-1989) National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) were used to promulgate presidential decisions and National Security Study Directives (NSSD) were used to direct that studies be undertaken involving national security policy and objectives. National Security Directives (NSD) were used during the administration of George Herbert Walker Bush (1989-1993) to promulgate national security decisions. Finally, National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID) emerged in 1947 to provide guidance to the entire United States intelligence community. These directives outline the organisation, procedure, and relationships of the numerous intelligence organisations within the federal government.
The Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was an interagency organisation created in 1965 by the US Embassy, Saigon, the US Operations Mission, and the US Information Agency as part of the US Mission in South Vietnam. JUSPAO co-ordinated all US psychological and information programs in South Vietnam. These programs explained and interpreted US policies to Vietnamese audiences. JUSPAO was also responsible for providing overall policy guidance to and co-ordination of US psychological operational efforts through analyses of captured Viet Cong and North Vietnamese papers. From these sources, they developed, advised, and supported countrywide psychological operations (PSYOPS) that involved the Vietnamese national media and the Vietnamese Ministry of Information. In the field, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) executed PSYOPS with JUSPAO providing support, especially for pacification and development programmes. Ultimately, JUSPAO was responsible for evaluating through captured papers PSYOP activities in the field and on the national level in order to determine their validity and effectiveness. These captured papers were compiled and distributed by the North Vietnam Affairs Division of the JUSPAO in the US Embassy. After Dec 1967, these notes were distributed by the Minister-Counsellor for Information, and after Oct 1972, by the US Information Service Branch of the US Embassy.
Terrorism: Special Studies, 1975-1991 is a collection of studies commissioned by the US government concerning international terrorism, 1975-1991. The US government contracted American universities, colleges, corporations, non-partisan policy centres, and individuals to provide data and analyses relating to terrorist threats to US foreign policy. University Publications of America then compiled the existing texts, which were available in US armed forces reports, US defence policy journals, non-partisan policy journals, academic journals, and academic symposia and conference proceedings, 1974-1991.
On 2 May 1946, the Research and Development Corporation (later RAND Corporation), a US non-partisan government policy guidance institution, produced a report commissioned by the US Air Force entitled 'Preliminary Design for an Experimental World Circling Spaceship'. It focused on the utility of a satellite for gathering scientific information on cosmic and terrestrial features. The report also identified potential military missions for a satellite: missile guidance, weapons delivery, weather reconnaissance, communications, attack assessment and observation. The RAND study was followed by further studies and, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, by the research and development of military space systems which centred on the provision of intelligence, launch detection, weather and navigation data and communications links. By 1991 the US military space program had developed distinct components: military space support systems, space weaponry, launch systems and launch centres, ground control facilities and the organisations for the formation and implementation of policy concerning military space operations. Military support systems represent the major component, both currently and historically, of US military space operations. The systems are used to support military and national security operations by the provision of data or establishment of vital communications links. Specific military space support functions include imaging, signals intelligence, ocean surveillance, missile launch detection, navigation, nuclear detonation detection, meteorology, geodesy, and communications and data relay relating to Soviet Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) fields, command, control, and communications centres, shipyards, ports, missile launch sites and military developments in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America. Satellites included the CORONA imaging satellite in 1960; the KH-11 electro-optical imaging satellite in 1976; ocean surveillance PARCAE satellites, 1976-1989; and, missile early warning Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS) satellites. While military support systems represent the main emphasis of the US military space program, two types of space weaponry have been under development since 1945: anti-satellite weapons and anti- missile weapons, including the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). SDI emerged under US President Ronald Wilson Reagan in 1983 and from the outset of the program, the functions of the SDI system were to identify ballistic missile launches, discriminate between warheads and decoys, track missiles, and point and fire the necessary weapons at the missiles and warheads. An element in placing military payloads in orbit is the launch system that can carry the payload and deploy it. From 1945 to 1989, the US relied on expendable launch vehicles (ELVs), and from 1990-1991 on space shuttle orbiters. US ground control consisted of inter-agency tracking and monitoring of satellite location and telemetry in ground control centres such as the Consolidated Space Test Center, Sunnyvale, CA, and the Consolidated Space Operations Center, Colorado Springs, CO. As for all areas of national security operations, the US National Security Council (NSC) was, and is, the policy making body with respect to space activity. Since 1958 it has reviewed space matters in committees and has issued policy decisions concerning military and civilian space activities. These decisions were represented by the respective Presidential, National Security Decision and National Security Directives on national space policy issued during the administrations of James Earl 'Jimmy' Carter, Jr, Ronald Wilson Reagan, and George Herbert Walker Bush. Below the NSC, organisations such as the National Reconnaissance Executive Committee were responsible for making policy decisions regarding the types of US reconnaissance satellites to be developed and their capabilities, the US Department of Defense considered matters specifically related to military space activity, and, in 1985, each of the military services formed a space organisation, under the US Space Command, to deal with space policy and operations, launch satellites, monitor foreign and US space activities and operate satellite systems.
The microfiche collection focuses on US foreign policy towards Iran and events in Iran, 20 Jan 1977-29 Jan 1980. This period coincides with the beginning of the relationship between Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, and the US administration under President James Earl 'Jimmy' Carter, Jr, through to the failure of American policy efforts towards the revolutionary Iranian government, which became symbolised by the seizing of the US Embassy in Teheran, Iran, in which 66 Americans were taken hostage by followers of Shiite cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, 4 Nov 1979. As a result of the embassy seizure, President Carter asked Cyrus Roberts Vance, US Secretary of State, to co-ordinate a secret inter-agency appraisal of US involvement in Iran since 1945. The resulting report, known as the 'White Paper', and its 12,000 pages of supporting documentation, provided the White House with an overview of US relations with an allied Iran, 1945-1978. The microfiche collection ends 29 Jan 1980, the date on which the 'White Paper' was transmitted to Zbigniew Brzezinski, US National Security Adviser, by the US State Department's Policy Planning Staff.This document collection originated from investigations done by newspaper reporter Scott Armstrong for his five-part series entitled 'The Fall of the Shah of Iran', published in the Washington Post, 25-30 Oct 1980. This newspaper series first revealed the existence of the so-called 'White Paper'. With the revelation of its existence, then researchers filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for the 'White Paper' itself and for the background documents used in its preparation. In addition, the Iranians who seized the US Embassy in Teheran captured material therein including official foreign policy memoranda and cables relating to declining relations between the US and Iran. These documents were subsequently published in Teheran, where they became known collectively as 'The Documents From the Den of Espionage', smuggled into the US, and eventually brought to the attention of Armstrong. Armstrong's subsequent five-part series of articles in the Washington Post entitled 'Iran Documents Give Rare Glimpse of a CIA Enterprise', beginning 31 Jan 1982, revealed to the public for the first time the nature of US foreign policy making in Iran 1977-1980. Documents in this microfiche collection are also from US government sources, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Finally, the US State Department's 'White Paper' and 700 supporting documents detailing US foreign policy decision making is included as are reports originating from the US Department of Defense, the US Department of Justice, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the US Army, Navy, and Air Force
This collection includes microfilmed documents compiled by Peter Nash, a post-graduate student in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, from the Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, relating to US naval operations in Europe, 1941-1946. In 1946, the Commander, US Naval Forces Europe, submitted to the Director of Naval History, draft chapters of an official history of US Naval Forces in Europe that came under the command of the Special Naval Observer, London; the Commander US Naval Forces in Europe; and, the Commander US 12 Fleet. US naval representation in Britain evolved rapidly from 1941 to 1946, and eventually resulted in a close collaborative effort between the Royal Navy and the US Navy. In 1940 US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt arranged to exchange fifty over-age destroyers for US rights to establish naval bases in British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. With the ABC-1 Plan, Jan-Mar 1941, American, British, and Canadian representatives agreed that if the US entered the war a joint strategy would be pursued in which Germany would be the prime target. The Plan also provided for a US Northwest Escort Group and for US submarines for Gibraltar. Anglo-American naval strategy unified further still with the Navy Basic War Plan, or Rainbow 5. This plan envisaged the US working closely with Britain to effect the decisive defeat of Germany and Italy, while a defensive strategy would be maintained in the Pacific until success against the European Axis powers had been assured. Advanced by US Rear Adm Kelly Turner, the plan formulated the Atlantic-first argument and thus ensured a close US co-ordination with Britain. In addition, Rainbow 5 gave detailed directions for the deployment of US forces to their respective military stations if the US entered the war against Germany. For example, a Special Naval Observer in London was designated the 'Prospective Commander of US Naval Forces in North European Water' on 11 Mar 1941 and from Apr-Sep 1941, a series of Special [US] Naval Officers were posted throughout Britain to liase with British naval officers on matters of naval co-operation and security. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec 1941, elaborate plans for US naval bases in Britain were modified and many of the forces originally assigned to Europe were directed to the Pacific. Throughout 1942, however, Anglo- American discussions decided the policy control and command structure for the Allied powers in the common struggle against Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would be established in Washington, DC, to determine grand strategy, and high ranking officers would represent the US whilst stationed in London. On 17 Mar 1942, Adm Harold Raynsford Stark was detached as the Chief of Naval Operations and assigned as Commander, [US] Naval Forces in Europe. As Chief of Naval Operations since 1939, he had taken the initiative in bringing about the military staff conversations between the US and British Chiefs of Staff in 1941 and was therefore considered by Adm Ernest King, Commander in Chief, US Fleet (later Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command), the most logical choice for liaison duties in Britain. From 1942 to 1946, COMNAVEU closely determined naval strategy and operations with Admiralty and created an effective diplomatic and military liaison office, which would represent US and Allied forces in Europe. This collection includes microfilmed documents from an official history of US naval administration in the European theatre. It was written by historians selected by COMNAVEU and the Director of Naval History, based primarily on official American and British documents collected and disseminated during the war. When completed in 1946, copies of the history were sent to the US Secretary of the Navy; the US Chief of Naval Operations; the Allied-US Naval Attaché in London (ALUSNA); Commander [US] Naval Forces in Europe (COMNAVEU); Commander [US] Naval Forces Germany (COMNAVFORGER); and Commander [US] Naval Forces Mediterranean (COMNAVMED).
The documents included in the collection were generated by a broad range of agencies within the US national security bureaucracy. Particularly significant are those materials that chronicle the actions of the primary decision making body in the US government during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (NSC). Reports describing world-wide military and political developments originating from the US State Department, US embassies abroad, the Central Intelligence Agency, the armed forces intelligence organisation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research are also prominent in the collection. In addition, US Defense Department, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and US armed forces internal military reports are included. Finally, records from independent organisations involved in the events of 1962 form a part of the collection, and include papers from the UN and the Organisation of American States (OAS).
The collection is a microfilmed copy of an official history published by the Office of the Chief, Military History General Reference Branch, US Army. Designed as an introductory volume to a general intelligence series for US Service School curriculum, all material consists of documents relating to Allied intelligence activities in the Far East, 1942-1950.
The Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) was a US intelligence agency employed by Gen Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, US Forces, Far East Command, and Maj Gen Charles A Willoughby, commander US G-2 Intelligence Section, during the American campaign against the Japanese in World War Two. Although established specifically to translate seized Japanese materials and provide interpreters for interrogations of prisoners, ATIS' mission also included analysis of Japanese military objectives and capabilities and political and psychological interpretations of Japanese military and civilian activities. ATIS was created by Allied General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ SWPA), on 19 Sep 1942 and was inter-service in character and function. Established as a centralised intelligence section in SWPA in response to the urgent need for timely, accurate intelligence on Japanese objectives and tactics, ATIS' was to translate and analyse seized Japanese military documents and interrogate Japanese prisoners of war. During the course of the war, ATIS moved its base each time GHQ SWPA moved, from Melbourne, Australia, to Hollandia, New Guinea, and then to Leyte Island and Manila, Philippines. ATIS advance units followed the earliest combat forces in each action throughout the drive towards Japan and as the scope of its intelligence operations expanded so did its staff. At its inception, ATIS consisted of a small contingent of officers and enlisted men, but by the end of the war, ATIS personnel numbered 250 officers and 1,700 enlisted staff members, which included dozens of Japanese-Americans. ATIS' transition from a wartime Allied, inter-service Section in SWPA to an Occupation Service within Supreme Command, Allied Powers (SCAP) began on 28 Aug 1945, when the various combined Allied Land, Naval, and Air Commands were dissolved by US General Order No 41. The need to assess the Japanese military as part of a larger effort to understand Japanese society, however, resulted in a reprieve for ATIS. It continued to perform its former function until it was officially disbanded on 30 April 1946.
In 1943 US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an Executive Order requiring the various departments and special agencies of government to prepare histories of their activities. US Army Ground Forces therefore organised a historical program that required a historian for each army and part-time historical officials in units down to special battalions. Along with these efforts, the US Army Historical Section began to co-ordinate efforts to collect historical material abroad. These efforts were strengthened by US Army Chief of Staff Gen George Catlett Marshall's desire to have studies prepared on lessons learned from current campaigns. The Historical Section, G-2 Division, thus deployed combat historians to interview combat soldiers in order to fill gaps left by official US Army reports. By 1944, the Historical Section selected a small group of historians to go from the US War Department, Washington, DC, to Great Britain in time to be briefed on the plans for the proposed Allied invasion of North-West Europe. The most extensive effort to collect historical material in World War Two was made during and following Operation OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of the Normandy coast, France, 6 Jun 1944. It is from this material that the editors of this collection have drawn their text. Before the conclusion of Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, US Gen Dwight David Eisenhower's drive from Normandy to Germany and Czechoslovakia, the US Army had five Information and Historical Sections at the five American armies, 1 Army, 3 Army, 7 Army, 9 Army, and 15 Army. By the end of the war, approximately seventy combat historians were engaged in collecting interviews and writing combat narratives. Although field interviews could not be taped, material was often gathered near the place and time of a significant action. Many of the combat interviews of World War Two were conducted in foxholes, cellars, or bomb shelters and recorded manually. Also, it should be noted that all the combat historians who conducted the interviews during World War Two were themselves in military service and familiar with the nature of unit training and weaponry.
From 1945 to 1991, the Soviet Union represented the primary target for the United States intelligence community. Recruiting agents in the Soviet bloc was the primary task of the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations. Meanwhile, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other technical collection agencies devised and deployed ground stations, aircraft, and satellites with the principal purpose of collecting intelligence to guide US decision makers in dealing with the Soviet Union and to assist the US military prepare for a possible war. Much of the product of those activities was reflected in the huge number of analytical documents produced by the CIA and other intelligence production units over the course of the Cold War. The key production organisations included the CIA (and its predecessor the Central Intelligence Group), the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Defense Intelligence Agency (from 1961), and the analytical units of the armed services. The collective focus of the US intelligence community on the Soviet Union was in five areas: foreign policy, military forces and policy, the economy, science and technology, and the domestic situation. Intelligence production in these areas came in a variety of forms. The best known were National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs). NIEs were regularly scheduled products that covered a number of subjects, the majority of which concerned military matters. SNIEs were commissioned in reaction to specific events or the emergence of specific concerns. As with the NIEs they were co-ordinated among the representatives of the intelligence agencies who served on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (until 1958), the United States Intelligence Board (until 1976), and the National Foreign Intelligence Board. NIEs and SNIEs attempted to estimate how events would develop. Other products, including Interagency Intelligence Memoranda (IIM) have also contributed intelligence based on highly technical matters. In addition to the production of national intelligence documents, each of the intelligence organisations produced studies which were not co- ordinated with other agencies. Thus, the Central Intelligence Group (1946-1948) and then the CIA produced an immense number of intelligence assessments and reports within various offices of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. Similarly, the Defense Intelligence Agency produced thousands of studies concerning Soviet matters, including studies of military doctrine, nuclear targeting policy, specific weapons, command, control and communications, and force deployment. Meanwhile, US State Department reports primarily included Soviet foreign policy and economic matters. At the armed service level, Soviet-related intelligence studies focused both on general military developments as well as technical studies of Soviet weapons systems. The former studies were conducted by organisations including the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, and the Air Force Intelligence Agency. Organisations including the Naval Intelligence Support Center and the Air Force Technology Division concentrated on issues of design, operation and capabilities of tanks, submarines, and aerospace vehicles.
During World War Two, the War Office published a series of instructional booklets for British Army personnel which detailed German Army field service uniforms, insignia, armour, weaponry, and tactics. The publications were designed for instructional purposes, and often included comparative studies of Allied and German weaponry and tactics as well as analyses of successful German operations
The Strategic Bombing Survey was established in the US War Department as a civilian activity, 3 Nov 1944, pursuant to Presidential directive, 9 Sep 1944. During its existence it studied the effects of Allied aerial attacks on Germany and German-occupied Europe (European Survey) and on Japan (Pacific Survey), to establish a basis for evaluating the importance and potential of air power as an instrument of military strategy and for planning the future development of the armed forces. It was abolished in 8 Oct 1947, with discontinuance of operations.
Ruhleben Camp was an internment camp near Berlin, Germany, which housed civilians of the Allied Nations who were living, working or holidaying in Germany on the outbreak of World War One. Camp detainees were allowed to administer their own affairs and were provided with amenities including a printing press. The volumes belonged to William Hunter, Chief Engineer aboard civilian ship the EDWIN HUNTER, which was docked in Kiel, Germany, at the outbreak of World War One.
Following the 1833 Slavery Abolition Act it was decided to use the Royal Navy to bring an end to the slave trade worldwide, and British diplomats began to negotiate treaties granting the Navy stop and search rights over vessels from various nations. The first set of official instructions to commanding officers setting out the limits of their rights under treaty was issued in 1844 with further editions in 1865, 1882 and 1892.
Born in 1898; commissioned into Indian Army, 1916; served with 4th Bn (Prince of Wales's Own), 8 Punjab Regt; Assistant Commandant, Chin Hills Bn (later 3 Chin Rifles), Burma Frontier Force, 1925-1929; Officer Commanding Military Police, Naga Hills Expedition, 1928; Commandant, Chin Hills Bn, 1932-1934, 1937-1942; Maj, 1934; died in 1983.
Born 1924; joined the Army and trained at the Army Apprentice College, Chepstow, Monmouthshire, 1939; served in World War Two, 1939-1945; service with the Glider Pilot Regt, 1943-1949; served at Arnhem, the Netherlands, Operation MARKET GARDEN, Sep 1944; service in India and Palestine, 1945-1949; commissioned into the South Wales Borderers, 1951; served in British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), Germany, Eritrea and Malaya, 1951-1957; Capt, 1952; student at Staff College, Camberley, Surrey, 1957; Headquarters, British Corps, Germany, 1957-1959; Maj, 1959; seconded to Nigerian Army, 1959; served in operations in the Cameroons [1961] and with UN Forces, Belgian Congo [1962-1964]; Staff Officer, UK [1964-1965]; Lt Col, 1965; Commanding Officer, Infantry Training Depot, UK, from 1965; commanded British Army Training Team, Jamaica, 1968; Col, 1969; Commandant, Non Commissioned Officer's Wing, School of Infantry, Warminster, Wiltshire, 1969-1972; retired 1974; died 1993.
Born in 1916; educated at Loretto School and Pembroke College, Cambridge; joined Cambridge University Auxiliary Air Squadron, 1936-1938; No 603 City of Edinburgh Sqn, Auxiliary Air Force, 1939-1941; involved in repelling German air attack on the Forth Road Bridge, Oct 1939; took part in Battle of Britain, 1940; served as night fighter pilot, 1941; served with 539 Sqn,1942-1943, and 219 Sqn, UK and North Africa, 1943; in charge of night fighter training at RAF HQ Command, 1944-1945; 613 Sqn, Auxiliary Air Force, 1946-1949; became excecutive director of a consultancy firm which pioneered the process of continuous casting of steel, 1950; died in 1982.
Born 1906; educated at Haileybury, the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and Caius College and Gonville College, Cambridge University; commissioned into the Corps of Royal Engineers, 1926; Secretary, Royal Engineers Flying Club, 1934-1935; service in Palestine, 1936; served in World War Two, 1939-1945; service in the Middle East, Italy, the Balkans and the Far East, 1941-1944; served with 7 Armoured Div, Western Desert [1939-1942]; service with Special Operations Executive (SOE), Greece, 1942-1943; commanded British Military Mission to Greek partisans in German occupied Greece, Jul 1942-Sep 1943; commanded operation to demolish the Gorgopotamos viaduct, Greece, Nov 1942; awarded DSO, 1943; commanded Operation WASHING, the destruction of the Asopos viaduct, Greece, Jun 1943; temporary Brig, 1943; awarded CBE, 1944; served in North West Europe, 1944-1945; service in the Far East, 1945; Lt Col, 1946; Col, 1949; served in 1 Commonwealth Div, Korean War, 1951-1952; Brig, 1955; Chief Engineer, British Troops in Egypt, 1955-1956; Deputy Director, Personnel Administration, War Office, 1956-1959; retired, 1959; Chief Civil Engineer, Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Company Limited, 1959-1964; Construction Manager, Power Gas Corporation Limited, Davy-Ashmore Group, 1964-1968; Regional Secretary, British Field Sports Society, 1968-1971; died 1997.
Publications: Greek entanglement (Rupert Hart-Davis, London, 1955).
Descriptions of Greek resistance groups (Greek: andartes) related to this collection:
ÅÁÌ: The National Liberation Front (Greek: Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo) led by Georges Siados was a Communist group affiliated with the KKE - the Communist Party of Greece (Greek: Kommounistiko Komma Elladas).
The military arm of EAM was ELAS, The National People's Liberation Army, (Greek: Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos), led by Ares Velouchiotis (real name Athanasios (Thanasis) Klaras).
EDES: The National Republican Greek League (Greek: Ethnikos Demokratikos Ellenikos Syndesmos), was an anti-Communist, Republican group, led by political leader Nikolaos Plasteras and military leader Gen Napoleon Zervas.
EKKA: National and Social Liberation (Greek: Ethnike kai Koinonike Apeleftherosis) led by Demetrios Psarros was a liberal, anti-Communist, Republican group.
Born in 1912; educated at Eton College and Trinity College, Cambridge; commissioned into Grenadier Guards, Sep 1933; Lt, 1935; saw first active service with 3 Bn Grenadier Guards in the retreat to Dunkirk, 1940; Capt, 1940; served with 3 Bn and 5 Bn, Grenadier Guards in North Africa and Italy, 1943-1945; stood unsuccessfully as Conservative candidate for Whitechapel, London in General Election of 1945; Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, HQ London District, 1946; commanded 1 Guards Parachute Bn, Palestine, 1946-1948; employed in War Office, 1946-1949; commanded 1 Bn Grenadier Guards, North Africa, 1950-1952; specially employed as General Staff Officer Grade 1 in planning of Queen Elizabeth II's Coronation, 1952-1953; member of Planning Staff, NATO Standing Group, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington DC, 1954-1956; studied at Imperial Defence College, 1958; commanded 4 Guards Bde, Germany, 1959-1961; General Officer Commanding, London District and Maj Gen commanding Household Bde, 1962-1965; General Officer Commanding Berlin (British Sector), 1966-1968; retired, 1968; died in 1993.
Born in 1918; joined Royal Fusiliers, [1939]; served with SOE Force 133, North West Greece, 1943-1944.
Born 1888, educated, Trinity College Cambridge; called to the Bar, Lincoln's Inn, 1912; served with Rifle Bde, Western Front, 1915-1916; served with No 1 Special Company, Royal Engineers, 1916; Artists Rifles, 1920-1940; Royal Engineers, 1940; Ships Adjutant, Troop Ships, 1942-1945; Alderman, London County Council (LCC), 1931-1949; member, LCC, 1949-1958; Deputy Chairman, LCC, 1947-1948; Deputy Lieutenant and a Justice for the Peace, County of London; Chairman, John Oakey & Sons Ltd; Chairman of National Heart Hospital and Tooting Bec Hospital, 1951; died, 1963.
Born in 1889; attended Royal Military College, Sandhurst, 1908-1909; joined 2 Battalion, The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), 1909; served in Malta with Scottish Rifles, 1911-1912; Signal Officer of 22 Brigade, 7 Division, 1914; appointed Captain; command of 7 Division Signal Company, 1915; Brigade Major, 91 Brigade in 7 Division, 1916; Brigade Major, 185 Brigade in 62 Division, 1917; appointed temporary Lt Col and command of 2 Infantry Battalion, Honourable Artillery Company, 7 Division, 1917; capture of Grave di Papadopoli, River Piave in Italy, 1918; attended Staff College, Camberley, 1920; Brigade Major, Experimental Brigade, 1921; Adjutant, The Cameronians, 1924; Company Commander, Sandhurst, 1925-1927; Instructor, Staff College in Camberley, 1927-1929; service with 1 Battalion, The Cameronians in Egypt, 1930; service in Lucknow, India, 1931-1932; General Staff Officer, Grade 2, War Office, 1932-1934; Imperial Defence College, London, 1935; command of Peshawar Brigade, North West Frontier Province, India, 1936-1938; command of 7 Infantry Division and Military Governor in Palestine, 1938-1939; 7 Division HQ transferred to Mersa Matruh, Egypt, 1939; Commander, Western Desert Force in Egypt, 1940; General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Troops in Egypt, 1941; captured and imprisoned in Castle Vincigliata, Italy, 1941; escape and arrival in England, 1943; command of 8 Corps, North West Europe, 1944; General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command in India, 1945; Gen, 1945; General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, North Western Army, India, 1945-1946; Adjutant General to the Forces, 1946; ADC General to the King, 1946; resigned as Adjutant General, 1947; Knight Grand Cross of the Bath, 1947; retired, 1948; Commandant of the Army Cadet Force, Scotland, 1948-1959; Colonel of the Cameronians, 1951-1954; Justice of the Peace, Ross and Cromarty, 1952; Lord Lieutenant for Ross and Cromarty, 1955-1964; Lord High Commissioner, Church of Scotland General Assembly, 1964; Knight of the Thistle, Jun 1971; died in 1981.
Born in 1894; attended Royal Naval Colleges, Osbourne and Dartmouth; Midshipman, 1912; served at sea in World War One, and later commanded HMS APHIS in China and HMS ROCHESTER on the Africa Station; Cdr, 1930; Naval Attaché, Lisbon, 1938-1944; SHAEF, 1944-1945; died in 1980.
Born in 1896; educated at Loyola College, Montreal and Royal Military College, Canada; served with Royal Engineers in France and Salonika, 1915-1918; Lt, 1916; Capt, 1918; worked with Indian State Railways, 1920-1934; Maj, 1930; served in Egypt and Palestine, 1935-1936, Hong Kong, 1938-1941, Iraq and Persia, 1941-1943, and with British Liberation Army, 1944-1945; Lt Col, 1938; Director of Fortifications and Works, War Office, 1947-1949; retired, 1949; died in 1985.
Born, 1918; educated: Mill Hill School; Merton College, Oxford 1937-1939 and 1945-1946. 1st class Hons in Maths BA and MA; Royal Engineers, Oct 1939; 2nd Lt, Mar 1946; field units and HQ 8th Army; mentioned in despatches twice, once in 1943 other unknown; served in France, [1940]; North Africa including El Alamein, 1942; Italy, 1943-1944; Staff College Camberley, 1944; MBE, 1944; served in Holland and Germany including the battle of Arnhem, 1944-1945; Lt Col, [1945]; OBE, [1945]; Head of Maths, Repton School, 1947-1949; Administrative Assistant in Education Dept, Salop County Council, 1949-1953; Assistant Education Officer then Deputy Director of Education, West Sussex County Council, 1953-1967; Chief Education Officer, Somerset County Council, 1967-1974; retired, 1974; died, 1996.
Served with O Company, 4 Bn, Special Bde, Royal Engineers, France, 1916.
Born 1896; served in World War One, 1914-1918; commissioned into 3 (Reserve) Bn, The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), 1914; Lt, 1915; Capt, 1916; served with Royal Flying Corps, 1916-1918; service with 34 Sqn, Royal Flying Corps, Western Front, 1917; served in Palestine, 1917-1918; awarded MC, 1918; transferred to RAF, 1918; relief of Diwaniyah, Iraq, 1921; RAF Staff College, Andover, Hampshire, 1925; service in Iraq, 1928; Wg Cdr, 1932; Air Staff Officer, Directorate of Operations and Intelligence, Department of the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Ministry, 1934-1937; Gp Capt, 1937; Air Attaché, Washington DC, USA, 1937-1940; served in World War Two, 1939-1945; Air Officer Commanding Northern Ireland, 1941; Air Officer in charge of Administration, Middle East, 1941-1943; awarded CBE, 1942; awarded CB, 1943; Director General, War Organisation, Air Ministry, 1943-1945; Deputy Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, South East Asia, 1945-1946; created KBE, 1946; Allied Air Commander-in-Chief, South East Asia, 1946-1947; Inspector General, RAF, 1948; Member, Air Council for Supply and Organisation, 1948-1950; ACM, 1949; Head of Air Force Staff, British Joint Services Mission to the USA, 1950-1951; retired, 1951; created KCB, 1951; Chairman, Air League of the British Empire, 1955-1958; died 1980.
Served in World War Two with No 2 Inland Waterways and Port Construction Unit, Royal Engineers and was involved in the preparation of dossiers on enemy occupied ports for use by port construction and repair companies.
born 1900; educated at Manchester University and postgraduate at London, Capetown and Oxford; Surgeon Lt Cdr, 1929; Royal Naval Hospital, Cape of Good Hope, South Africa, 1931-1934; Surgeon Cdr, 1934; Medical Officer's Promotion Course, 1935; Medical Officer in charge, Royal Naval Sick Quarters, Weihaiwei, northern China, 1937-1940; served in World War Two, 1939-1945; awarded OBE, 1941; Surgeon Capt, 1944; Medical Officer in charge of Royal Naval Hospitals Simonstown, South Africa, 1946, Portland, 1948 and Bermuda, 1950; Surgeon R Adm, 1954; Queen's Honorary Surgeon, 1954-1957; Surgeon R Adm in charge of Royal Naval Hospital, Plymouth, 1954-1957; retired 1957; awarded CB, 1957; died 1984.
Born in 1874; mining engineer, New Mashonaland Development Company Ltd, Rhodesia, 1900-1901; died in 1937.
Born in 1881; cadet, Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, 1898; 2nd Lt, Royal Field Artillery, 1899; joined 12 Battery, 1900; served in North China, 1900-1901; served in India, 1901-1914; commanded 7 Ammunition Column, 1901; Lt, 1901; commanded 12 Battery, 1902-1903; Range Officer, Royal Horse Artillery and Royal Field Artillery, Madras Command, 1903-1905; Capt, 1908; Instructor, Army School of Signalling, Poona, 1908; Assistant Inspector , Army Signalling, Southern Army, 1908; raised and commanded 5 Ammunition Column, 1909; raised and commanded 33 Indian Divisional Signalling Company, 1911; raised and commanded 36 Indian Divisional Signalling Company, 1914; Maj 1914; Deputy Director of Army Signals and Telegraphs, Mesopotamia, 1915; Director of Army Signals and Telegraphs, Mesopotamia, 1916; served with 112 Bde, Royal Field Artillery, France, 1918, and with 65 Battery and 28 Bde, Royal Field Artillery, Black Sea, 1920-1921; Lt Col, 1921; commanded 6 Reserve Bde, 1921-1922; commanded 16 Bde, India, 1922-1924; Commander Corps of Royal Artillery, Southern Command, India, 1924; Col, 1925; Commander, 28 Air Defence Bde, Tonbridge, 1925; retired pay, 1930; died in 1963.
Born 1914; served with RAF technical branch (engineers); commissioned as Flight Lieutenant, 1947; Squadron Leader, 1954; Wing Commander, 1963; retired, 1969; died 1981.