Identity area
Type of entity
Authorized form of name
Parallel form(s) of name
Standardized form(s) of name according to other rules
Other form(s) of name
Identifiers for corporate bodies
Description area
Dates of existence
History
Documents included in the collection relate to the US government's internal decision making process during the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962. The collection is primarily a record of executive decision making during the presidential administrations of Dwight David Eisenhower and John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and includes material generated by a broad range of agencies within the US national security bureaucracy. Particularly significant are those materials that chronicle the actions of the primary decision making bodies in the US government during the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962, the Office of the White House, the US Department of State, the US Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During the Eisenhower administration the Department of State played a central role in policy making because of the president's close working relationship with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his successor, Christian Archibald Herter. During the Kennedy administration, the State Department's role became more operational while the direction of Berlin and German policy shifted to the White House and the national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy. As the co-ordinating and policy making structure for the US military, the US Department of Defense was responsible for developing US nuclear and conventional force structures. During the Eisenhower administration, Secretaries of Defense Neil McElroy and Thomas S(overeign) Gates worked with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing recommendations on contingency planning which the President and the Secretary of State could synchronise with budget priorities. Under the Kennedy administration, Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara worked to integrate conventional forces options into Allied military planning on Berlin as well as to ensure more centralised control over US nuclear weapons in Western Europe in order to prevent accidental use. After the US occupation of West Berlin, the Central Intelligence Agency used the city as a base for intelligence operations and covert activities aimed at the Soviet bloc. The CIA tasked its Office of National Estimates (ONE) and Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) with analysing and reporting on German and Berlin developments. ONE prepared National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates on the Berlin situation which were circulated among senior officials at the Departments of State and Defense and the White House. OCI prepared weekly intelligence reports that were less analytical and included reporting on recent Berlin-related developments.